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ANALYSIS ON HOW THE MARINE CORPS HAS CREATED 
POLICY AND INTEGRATED ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING 
THROUGHOUT THE FORCE. 
ABSTRACT 
This joint applied project analyzed the Marine Corps’ integration of additive 
manufacturing (AM) technology throughout the force. Principally, it analyzed the 
publication Marine Corps Order (MCO) 4700.4 and examined how this document 
supports AM integration. The primary research question addressed AM’s current position 
within the Marine Corps and what areas could be improved. The most significant area for 
improvement was cybersecurity concerns. One secondary research question addressed 
specific risks AM technologies present and how the Marine Corps has or can mitigate 
those risks. This question supported the primary research question by expounding on the 
risks of cybersecurity to AM. Another secondary research question was to address what 
unique opportunities AM technologies provide and how the Marine Corps can fully 
harness those opportunities. This research question demonstrated AM’s benefits beyond 
maintenance and cost savings, such as humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations and 
logistics operations within China’s weapon engagement zone in the South China Sea. 
Overall, this analysis sought to provide direction and focus to any potential revision of 
MCO 4700.4 in the future. The data collection was conducted by examining recent 
articles (approximately less than five years) to determine the state of the technology in 
the private, public, and military sectors. The analysis remained at the unclassified level to 
ease distribution of this report. 
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With unhindered supply lines of communications (SLOCs), the U.S. military 
presents an existential threat to any adversarial nation or nonstate actor. Several historical 
examples demonstrate how unfettered supply lines provide an overwhelming advantage for 
an army. One such example is the nomadic Mongolian Horde led by Genghis Khan, who 
were able to conduct operations far from Mongolia without the hindrance of supply line 
interference. As a nomadic tribe who roamed and lived off the land, his forces did not 
require the traditional supply lines back to a rearward base when other armies of the time 
required this reach back for supplies. Along with a few other factors, this aspect of the 
Mongolian Horde presented an existential threat to the vastly larger armies of Asia and 
Eastern Europe (Carlin, 2012).  
However, once those SLOCs become threatened, then the existential threat that a 
dominant nation can impose upon an adversary becomes either significantly degraded or 
lost entirely. Thus, for the United States to maintain a military advantage over its 
adversaries, the military must harden these SLOCs for any potential future conflict with 
near peer adversaries. More specifically, the U.S. military’s dominance in the air, land, and 
sea domains of warfare enables this overmatch against its adversaries. New challenges have 
arisen with the advent of the space and cyber domain. These new challenges offer gaps for 
foreign adversaries to exploit and threaten the U.S. military’s unhindered SLOCs. Unless 
steps are taken to harden these SLOCs, the U.S. military will start to face an existential 
threat instead of being the threat to adversarial state and nonstate actors.  
One of the primary missions of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) is to 
provide the U.S. military with a fighting force that specializes in conducting the full range 
of military operations (ROMO) in often remote and austere environments. Over the past 
two decades, the Marine Corps has proven to be successful with the luxury of unhindered 
SLOCs as the adversaries seen in Iraqi and Afghanistan did not present a significant threat 
to supplies lines out of the respective country. Unfortunately, the Marine Corps will be 
severely impacted if those SLOCs were to be hindered. Thus, the Marine Corps must seek 
out options to either harden or remove the need for these SLOCs.  
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Additive manufacturing (AM)—or three-dimensional printing (3DP)—provides 
the Marine Corps an option for hardening and, in certain cases, removing the threat to its 
SLOCs (note that the terms AM and 3DP are used interchangeably throughout this 
research). The commercial use of AM started as far back as 1987 with the introduction of 
stereolithography (STL) but grew rapidly in both reach, availability, and even purpose in 
the 2010s (Wohlers & Gornet, 2016). Seeing the benefits of AM, the Marine Corps has 
taken strides over the past decade to integrate AM throughout the force.  
The reason why AM is such an enabler for hardening SLOCs is that it allows for 
the transport of basic manufacturing feedstock such as plastics and metals instead of high-
end, low-density end-items such as specialized repair parts through a supply chain. For 
example, a chassis for a radio system or a plastic handle for a vehicle door could be made 
from the same polymer. Without AM, the chassis and the door handle would have to be 
made by specialized and separate vendors and then shipped from, most likely, the 
continental United States to a foreign and remote location. However, AM offers the 
sourcing of polymers from both in and out of the continental United States as well as from 
just one vendor. By requiring transport for only basic manufacturing feedstock and then 
manufacturing the end-item at the point of need instead of transporting the end-item 
through the entire supply chain, the Marine Corps can develop multiple SLOCs throughout 
the world to transport the basic manufacturing feedstock shorter distances and at greater 
numbers compared to transporting the end-item from the original equipment manufacturer 
(OEM). The reason for greater numbers is that basic manufacturing feedstock of just 
polymers offers the warfighter a wider range of end-items as opposed to an end-item that 
cannot be remade into another part based upon demand. Furthermore, as these OEMs are 
generally located in the continental United States, a limited number of SLOCs are 
available. Thus, if the Marine Corps could globalize its SLOCs, they would become 
hardened through obscurity in the form of various options to draw resources as well as 
shorter distances from the resource deposit to the point of need. 
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A. PURPOSE AND BENEFIT OF THIS RESEARCH 
This research seeks to evaluate the Marines Corps’ efforts in the field of AM. The 
primary research question is 
• What is additive manufacturing’s current position within the Marine Corps, 
and what areas could be improved?  
This primary research question does not suggest that great feats have not already 
been achieved. Furthermore, this research highlights areas where the Marine Corps has 
excelled, but this primary research question seeks to identify gaps as well to further 
advance AM in the Marine Corps and harden those gains already achieved. Two secondary 
research questions address the impacts that AM will have on the Marine Corps in the 
coming decade: 
• What unique risks does AM present to the Marine Corps? 
• What specific opportunities does AM provide the Marine Corps that they 
are not pursuing or are not pursuing to their fullest extent? 
As AM has doctrinal implications to how the Marine Corps will supply and sustain 
future wars, the Marine Corps must take a programmatic approach to AM integration. 
Scholars and historians state that the world is entering into the Fourth Industrial Revolution 
with the advent of certain technological advances, including AM, ushering in this 
revolution. By their very nature, revolutions are highly volatile, and uncertain outcomes 
are the norm. These new technologies will enable even smaller militaries to be capable of 
more significant global impacts (Tuang, 2018). If smaller militaries are now able to enter 
and compete in the global arena, then near peer adversaries could pose significant threats 
to the U.S. military. Consequently, the Marine Corps must quickly but effectively integrate 
these new technologies before adversaries can leverage the processes. Without integrating 
AM correctly, the Marine Corps would allow the United States’ adversaries the option to 
dictate tempo. Thus, the desired benefits of this research are the inclusion or at least 
consideration of the author’s recommendations into any revisions of Marine Corps Order 
(MCO) 4700.4 or any other AM policy published by the Marine Corps. 
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B. METHOD 
On March 23, 2020, Lieutenant General Charles G. Chiarotti signed MCO 4700.4. 
This order, the Marine Corps’ AM policy, was the first time the Marine Corps dedicated 
an order to AM. At the time of signing, LtGen Chiarotti was serving as the deputy 
commandant for installations and logistics. This research centers around evaluating MCO 
4700.4, as this document now serves as the source point for all matters pertaining to AM. 
The research provides an overview of the sections of the order that have done or will do 
well for the Marine Corps and the parts that either need improvement or inclusion in the 
revision of the order. Analysis of the order is conducted on pertinent literature in an effort 
to draw conclusions between the material reviewed and how it has or can positively affect 
MCO 4700.4. 
C. RESEARCH STRUCTURE 
This research is structured into five chapters. This first chapter serves as an 
introduction to the adoption of AM into the Marine Corps. The second chapter provides a 
background to AM efforts in the Marine Corps and particularly focuses on the published 
literature prior to the publication of MCO 4700.4. The third chapter is a literature review 
of civilian and international AM initiatives, Department of Defense (DOD) and 
Department of the Navy (DON) initiatives, and Marine Corps initiatives outside of the 
MCO; this chapter concludes with a review of the MCO 4700.4. The fourth chapter will 
provide an analytical review of and conclusions from the aforementioned literature. The 
fifth and final chapter provides the author’s recommendations as well as suggestions for 
further research. 
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II. ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING BACKGROUND 
IN THE MARINE CORPS 
In September 2019, Captain Ian Carter, USMC (2019) wrote a thesis titled “A 
Systems Approach to Additive Manufacturing in the Marine Corps.” In his thesis, Carter 
captured the then-current status of AM in the Marine Corps and offered a way forward for 
the Marine Corps to adequately integrate AM throughout the force. His introduction 
summarizes the several other theses that have been written by fellow Marine Corps officers 
about AM in the Marine Corps in the past 5 years. He goes on to briefly discuss two Marine 
administrative messages (MARADMINs) that provided guidance to the Marine Corps for 
the implementation of AM throughout the force (Carter, 2019). However, at the time of his 
writing, two more MARADMINs and MCO 4700.4 had not been published yet. This thesis 
lays out a brief description of each of the MARADMINs to provide context regarding their 
influence on the MCO and the current status of AM integration in the Marine Corps.  
A. MARADMIN 489/16 
MARADMIN 489/16 was the initial MARADMIN providing guidance to the 
Marine Corps on the application of AM. Published in September 2016, MARADMIN 
489/16 was not the first time the Marine Corps employed AM; however, it was the first 
step to formalize AM in the Marine Corps. It defined AM as “the process of joining 
materials to make objects from 3D model data, usually layer upon layer, as opposed to 
subtractive (traditional) manufacturing methodologies” (United States Marine Corps 
[USMC], 2016, para. 2). Also, it listed the basic materials (plastics, metals, rubbers, 
energetics, concretes, foods, and organic tissues) and purposes (prototyping, tooling, 
repair, and manufacturing) of AM in the Marine Corps. The message highlighted that it 
would only address ground support and would not apply to aviation or ground support 
equipment (GSE) in support of aviation activities. MARADMIN 209/18 eventually 
provided that AM aviation guidance, which is discussed in a later section. The message 
also stressed the highly uncertain and rapidly evolving nature of AM; however, it did not 
mention anything about cybersecurity considerations. 
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The major purpose of the MARADMIN was a call for action for commanders to 
encourage their Marines to seek out innovative solutions while remembering safety, 
warranty, and intellectual property (IP) considerations (USMC, 2016). The aforementioned 
solutions being sought were not solely from a maintenance perspective but rather with 
consideration for overall readiness to study whether AM could not only repair broken parts 
faster or cheaper, but to allow parts to be remade to be lighter, stronger, or better for the 
situation at hand. Finally, the MARADMIN designated the deputy commandant of 
installation and logistics (DC I&L) to serve as the head for AM activities, with the Next 
Generation Logistics–Additive Manufacturing (NexLog–AM) organization as the lead 
agent (USMC, 2016).  
B. MARADMIN 594/17 
Following MARADMIN 489/17, MARADMIN 594/17 was published a year later 
and provided more clarifying guidance in support of the initial MARADMIN. It 
specifically targeted commands and commanders at the rank of O-5 or above to be the 
driving force for a bottom-up approach to the adoption of AM. However, it did not remove 
innovative latitude that all Marines were to seek out unique solutions to then be submitted 
up the chain of command. The message also allowed commanders the ability to purchase 
commercial 3-dimensional (3D) printers and other AM equipment and provided guidance 
on how to manage and track equipment in the supply system through the Global Combat 
Support System–Marine Corps (GCSS–MC). The message expanded upon legal 
considerations and ensured O-5 commanders were informed on IP matters and provided 
the MCSC patent attorney as a resource for consultation. Finally, this MARADMIN did 
address cybersecurity but simply tasked MCSC to “develop a plan for the digital repository 
to safeguard model and data integrity and implement cybersecurity measures” (USMC, 
2017, para. 3). Furthermore, it published the uniform resource locator (URL) of the digital 
repository. Last, all MARADMINs are open-source pieces of information that require zero 
authentication to access; a simple search through Google could find the MARADMINs 
archive, MARADMIN 594/17, and the specific URL for the digital repository. 
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A major contribution of the message came in the form of categorizing AM files into 
digital bins of green, yellow, and red. Green items were those items either already located 
in the digital repository of AM parts called the Marine Corps AM Information Exchange 
Portal (IEP) or that met the risk guidelines of a green category item. The AM IEP was 
maintained and operated by Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC). If the item was 
not located in the digital repository, commands were directed to send their files to MCSC 
to upload the file to the digital repository. The key distinction of a green item is that it did 
not require prior approval before printing and applying the item. Yellow items were those 
not located in the Marine Corps AM IEP and required the approval of the first O-5 in the 
chain of command due to the item’s risk rating. Following the commander’s approval, the 
item’s file would be again sent off to MCSC for further review and evaluation prior to 
inclusion into the digital repository and Marine Corps–wide usage. The red bin category 
was for those items deemed to present critical or serious risk and required prior approval 
directly from MCSC prior to printing and usage. However, the message did provide the 
caveat that if the local O-5 commander deemed that “successful completion of combat 
operations are at risk” (USMC, 2017) without the item, the item could be printed in those 
special situations. The takeaway of this green, yellow, and red bin system is that the Marine 
Corps wanted to empower O-5 commanders and commands into pushing AM integration 
forward and embracing the bottom-up approach.  
Finally, the message introduced the concept of the Marine Maker laboratories on 
major Marine Corps installations. These spaces would provide Marines of all ranks a 
facility or workspace with which to collaborate on joint AM projects or endeavors. The 
primary objective of these laboratories was to “foster creativity, collaboration, risk 
tolerance, and bottom-up adoption of digital manufacturing techniques” (USMC, 2017).  
C. MARADMIN 209/18 
Neither MARADMIN 489/16 nor MARADMIN 594/17 provide specific AM 
guidance regarding aviation equipment. MARADMIN 209/18, published in April 2018, 
seeks to provide that tailored guidance on the implementation of AM regarding aviation 
equipment and its GSE. One key point provided by this MARADMIN is that DC I&L 
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would not be the lead for aviation-specific AM parts; rather, deputy commandant for 
aviation (DC AVN) would serve as the lead. Furthermore, aviation-specific AM files 
would need to be routed up to Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) for approval rather 
than to MCSC. MCSC and NexLog–AM would serve only as a supporting element to 
aviation AM endeavors. Cases for and against the separation of aviation from the rest of 
the AM community can be made; however, that argument and research can be addressed 
in a separate thesis. This research examines AM through a holistic lens and addresses AM 
activities with the primary focus and research data coming from ground-specific items. 
However, when aviation-specific items arise, those particulars will be addressed. 
D. MARADMIN 055/19 
MARADMIN 055/19 serves as the last in a series of MARADMINs to address AM 
prior to the formal publication of the MCO. Neither this MARADMIN nor any other seeks 
to be a replacement of the preceding MARADMINs but rather an expansion, and it states 
that fact in the message’s opening statements. As 3 years passed between the original 
message and this message, MARADMIN 055/19 was able to draw on some data points to 
highlight the then current status of AM in the Marine Corps. Some of these data points 
include the number of printers deployed, how many files have been uploaded to MCSC’s 
AM IEP, the introduction of metal AM printers aboard a few major Marine Corps 
installations and commands, the 3DP of concrete using construction-scale additive 
manufacturing (CSAM), and the introduction of the first AM program of record (POR)—
the expeditionary fabrication (XFAB) container.  
Furthermore, the message established the Additive Manufacturing Operations Cell 
(AMOC) under the command of MCSC. This cell would serve as a “24/7 help desk to 
answer questions, field requests for prints, and fully vet any part that requires fabrication 
by a Marine organization” (USMC, 2017). The message also created another working 
group to work with the United States Navy (USN) and America Makes to formalize a 
training program.  
The message highlighted joint considerations for the first time and implied a few 
more cybersecurity considerations. However, as the DOD conducts more joint operations 
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and the cyber domain continues to grow in scope and reach, the Marine Corps must take a 
larger role in developing joint operating procedures and consider cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities with regard to AM. 
E. MCO 4700.4 
As stated previously, MCO 4700.4 was signed on March 23, 2020. The order was 
signed by DC I&L and stated that they would be the lead for AM integration throughout 
the Marine Corps. However, significant collaboration occurred in the genesis of this order 
as it affects many different organizations throughout the Marine Corps. One such example 
is Training & Education Command (TECOM), which plays a significant role in the creation 
of a training program for AM in the various school houses. Another significant contributor 
was the MCSC’s AMOC. At this point in AM’s history in the Marine Corps, the NexLog–
AM organization had been replaced by the AMOC as the lead agent of AM integration. 
On May 15, 2020, the three ground-specific MARADMINs (i.e., 489/16, 594/17, 
and 055/19) were canceled, while MARADMIN 209/18 remains active. The reason for this 
distinction is that MCO 4700.4 as well as MARADMIN 489/16, 594/17, and 055/19 were 
all signed by DC I&L. MARADMIN 209/18 was signed by DC AVN. MCO 4700.4 even 
tasks DC AVN to address all aviation-specific AM considerations. The key point to take 
away is that a clear divide is now formed between aviation and ground AM efforts. The 
cancellations do not suggest that their material is now invalid; rather, the cancellation 
marked a strategic shift for AM to become more formalized throughout the Marine Corps 
by making it an order. The only step remaining to make AM even more formal would be 
to make AM doctrine. However, that seems unlikely and not entirely necessary—at least 
at this present time. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 4, Logistics, could be 
revised to include AM, but making a stand-alone doctrinal publication just for AM appears 
unnecessary. Thus, an order is the appropriate level for AM going forward. The two 
following chapters include a review and analysis of this MCO in context of the current 
state of AM in the Marine Corps and DOD.  
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Concurrently to the writing of MARADMINs 489/16, 594/17, 209/18, and 055/19, 
the civilian sector, the DOD, and other services of the military were planning and 
implementing AM technology into their respective organizations. As AM provides a 
strategic shift in several logistics functions, the Marine Corps has and should continue to 
research these successes and failures to incorporate those lessons into any future revision 
of MCO 4700.4. This chapter includes a review of civilian and international literature, 
DOD literature, other military services’ literature, and Marine Corps literature outside 
MCO 4700.4. Following these subsections, this chapter concludes with a comprehensive 
literature review of MCO 4700.4. Note that all literature is either open-source information 
and obtained through internet search engines or provided directly from MCSC’s AMOC. 
A. CIVILIAN AND INTERNATIONAL AM LITERATURE REVIEW  
Tuang (2018) wrote that “with the 21st century, we are now witnessing the dawn 
of the [Fourth Industrial Revolution]” (p. 1). Tuang’s research focused on a core group of 
technologies that were leading this fourth industrial revolution. These technologies include 
mobile internet through smartphones, integrated and networked sensors, genetic 
engineering, renewable energy, and AM. All these technologies paired together will allow 
militaries of all sizes to be “more mobile, less tethered to supply lines, and possess greater 
operational endurance” (Tuang, 2018, p. 16). Even though AM is only one of these 
technologies, it will allow the Marine Corps to increase its expeditionary capabilities and 
maneuver warfare ethos in both kinetic and nonkinetic operations. Kinetic operations relate 
to combat; an example of a nonkinetic operation is humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief (HADR) operations. With applications of AM expanding in scope, the materials 
being used are also expanding beyond traditional polymers and metals into other materials 
such as concrete (Hanna, 2019) and circuitry (Elinoff, 2020). AM’s use for concrete 
demonstrates its ability to contribute to large-scale construction of structures and similar-
sized items, while its use for the production of circuity demonstrates the expanding list of 
highly specialized and technical items available for print. However, this industrial 
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revolution is a global phenomenon and is not just isolated to the United States. Thus, any 
organization must take into consideration the cybersecurity risks and interference from 
foreign agents when integrating AM technology into their standard operating procedures 
(SOPs). However, not all foreign agents have nefarious intent toward the United States. 
The Marine Corps has the opportunity to help allies expand their own AM technologies, 
partner with allied nations on future AM initiatives, and safeguard U.S. and foreign 
nations’ digital repositories against foreign adversaries seeking attack vectors into this new 
industrial revolution. 
Super Typhoon Yolanda made landfall in the Philippines on November 8, 2013. 
This Category 5 typhoon significantly damaged several cities and towns throughout the 
Philippines, including Tacloban City, and dislocated 17 million people from their homes. 
This storm is considered one of the most powerful typhoons in recorded history (Reid, 
2018). The Marine Corps responded swiftly to this humanitarian crisis by conducting 
Operation Damayan on November 10, 2013 (Lewis, 2013). The Marine Corps sent 250 
personnel to deliver 129,000 pounds of relief supplies including food, water, and other 
emergency supplies. The Marine Corps conducted the emergency evacuations for over 160 
individuals in Tacloban City alone. This example is not an isolated incident. From 1990 to 
2013, the Marine Corps has conducted over 40 HADR operations for just the Philippines 
and will continue to do so as disasters occur in that country (Lewis, 2013). Furthermore, 
the Marine Corps conducts HADR missions not just in the Philippines or the U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR) but around the world. A 
key enabler for diplomatic relationships with allies and partners is the U.S. capabilities to 
respond rapidly to disasters. 
In 2018, a team of international researchers wrote on the benefits of AM in support 
of HADR operations and how AM can overcome the unique challenges in HADR 
operations. First, “Supply chain logistics for humanitarian responses are some of the most 
complex that exist. It is challenging to forecast both the demand (due to difficulties in 
knowing both the timing of a disaster and details of the population affected) and the supply” 
(Savonen et al., 2018, p. 2). Second, with the uncertainty of the location of the disaster and 
both materials required and availability, 60% to 80% of all aid money is spent on 
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procurement (Savonen et al., 2018). Third, the researchers also highlighted that the 
International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) has a catalog of 
approximately 10,000 different items that are shipped to disaster relief locations. The 
researchers then discussed six 3D printers’ requirements and eight design considerations 
for the ideal printer in HADR operations. Finally, the research concluded with a review 
and analysis of a 3D printer, the Kijenzi 3D Printer, as one example of a highly mobile and 
low-profile printer that could have a significant impact on HADR operations. 
Savonen and his team’s (2018) 3D printer requirements, as seen in Table 1, and 
design characteristics, as seen in Table 2, offer a grading rubric with which the Marine 
Corps can assess the 3D printers it plans to use to conduct HADR operations. Even though 
the ICRC and other civilian entities have different missions during HADR operations, the 
logistical challenges that both organizations face are similar, and AM can help mitigate 
those challenges. Unlike other civil–military operations, where host nation support to the 
military can be expected, disaster operations should employ systems that strive to diminish 
the demand on host nation assistance to disaster relief operations. Another challenge is that 
HADR operations require various items to be procured outside the host nation, transported, 
and then distributed within the host nation.  
Table 1. Six Required Capabilities of a Humanitarian 3D Printer. 




Requirement #1 The 3D printer must be able to make useful parts. 
Requirement #2 The 3D printer must be able to function independent of infrastructure. 
Requirement #3 The 3D printer must be able to be easily transported. 
Requirement #4 The 3D printer must be safe and easy to use. 
Requirement #5 The 3D printer must be able to withstand harsh environments. 
Requirement #6 The 3D printer must be able to be procured for minimal cost. 
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Table 2. Eight Design Characteristics of a Humanitarian 3D Printer. 
Source: Savonen et al. (2018).  
Design Characteristic 
Number 
Design Characteristic Description 
Design Characteristic #1 Fused Filament Fabrication (FFF) 
Design Characteristic #2 Open-Source RepRap Design 
Design Characteristic #3 Modular Design 
Design Characteristic #4 Separable Frame 
Design Characteristic #5 Protected Electronics  
Design Characteristic #6 On-Board Computer System 
Design Characteristic #7 Flexible Power Supply 
Design Characteristic #8 Climate Control Mechanisms 
 
Following the layout of the 3D printer requirements and design characteristics, 
Savonen’s team discussed the Kijenzi 3D printer and how that particular printer either 
meets or does not meet the requirements and design characteristics for a HADR 3D printer. 
As seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2, the Kijenzi 3D printer’s low profile and easy assembly 
and disassembly could provide several benefits for the conduct of HADR operations. 
 
Figure 1. Kijenzi 3D Printer Assembled Control Box and Printer Bed. 
Source: Savonen et al. (2018).  
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Figure 2. Kijenzi 3D Printer Disassembled Control Box and Printer Bed. 
Source: Savonen et al. (2018). 
The Kijenzi 3D printer offers several other benefits for HADR operations (Savonen 
et al., 2018). First, the printer can integrate with various energy sources such as batteries, 
generators, and solar power motors. The printer can integrate into the host nation power 
infrastructure if available, but the printer’s highly flexible power sources do not make this 
host nation support a requirement. Furthermore, with the advances in solar energy 
capabilities, this 3D printer has the capability to operate autonomously in austere 
environments without the need for the fuel source to be shipped from outside and 
throughout the host nation. Second, as seen in Figure 3, the printer’s small profile and light 
weight allow for easy transport on multiple platforms to remote locations. Third, by only 
requiring raw materials, packaging and several other shipping constraints are reduced to 
allow for far more efficiencies in shipping only raw materials—not specific items—
throughout the global supply chain. Fourth, and finally, as seen in Figure 4, the range of 
high-demand, low-density medical items provide robust and rapid capabilities to medical 
teams on the ground. The parts depicted include a pill sorter, a slide dryer, a uterine model, 
a replica of umbilical cord clamps, and a replacement knob for a microscope. Even though 
these parts provided more support to USN medical and civilian medical organizations 
instead of Marine Corps operations, the key difference was not the equipment or the 
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hardware but a change in the software or the computer aided design (CAD) file. Thus, even 
though the examples are medical in nature, repair parts and other unique items can be 
created for the Marine Corps by a printer similar to the Kijenzi 3D printer. 
 
Figure 3. Packed Kijenzi 3D Printer. Source: Savonen et al. (2018). 
 
Figure 4. 3D Printed Medical Parts. Source: Savonen et al. (2018).  
In 2020, another research team with the Netherlands Royal Army also looked at the 
benefits of AM to HADR operations. Even though they did not review a particular printer, 
this team further expanded upon on the unique challenges of conducting HADR operations 
with similar conclusions to Savonen and his team’s research. These challenges include 
parts requirements that are not known until the disaster has already occurred, local 
infrastructure that will most likely be damaged and thus hinder transportation and 
distribution, a lack of organic transportation equipment to augment foreign aid 
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organizations, local governmental that will likely not be in full control, nefarious nonstate 
actors that present a threat of physical violence, and the mass quantities of various items 
that are required (Boer et al., 2020). Boer and his team recommended several propositions 
on the benefits of AM. However, as depicted in Table 3, two in particular demonstrate how 
AM could benefit organizations in the execution of HADR operations. Boer and his team 
further discussed the advantages of centralized or distributed AM spare parts supply chain 
management. A centralized process benefits items with a below-average demand and long 
manufacturing lead times, while a distributed process benefits items with unpredictable 
demand and short manufacturing lead times (Boer et al., 2020). Consequently, supply 
chains should employ both centralized and distributed AM activities and tailor the AM 
capabilities to produce particular items that are best suited for the location of the 3D printer. 
Savonen, Boer, and their teams highlight that the international community is focused on 
incorporating AM in the conduct of HADR operations. These researchers and international 
organizations offer a unique partnership for the Marine Corps to pursue in developing and 
advancing its own 3DP capabilities. 
Table 3. Two Propositions to the Benefits of AM. 
Source: Boer et al. (2020).  
Proposition 
Number Proposition Description 
Proposition #1 AM can improve spare parts availability in terms of speed, location 
and life cycle and hence make military and humanitarian missions 
more responsive. 
Proposition #2 AM improves sustainability, in terms of environmental impact, of 
military and humanitarian operations at large, but in particular spare 
parts supply during missions. 
 
Outside of HADR operations, the international community is advancing other AM 
initiatives in not only the development of spare parts but also the creation of buildings and 
other larger objects. As depicted in Figure 5, a Danish company in 2017 constructed a 
building on demand (BOD) with the dimensions of 8 × 8 × 6 meters with a print speed of 
2.5 meters per minute. This accomplishment not only resulted in the construction of a 
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building within days—not weeks or months—but also within the strict European norms 
and standards (Hanna, 2019). As depicted in Figure 6, a French company in 2017 
developed its own 95 square meter home called a YHNOVA home. Even though the project 
took several months to complete, construction of the dwelling itself only took a few days. 
Finally, the company utilized advance construction technologies and combined several 
previously separate processes into one. This combination drove down construction time, 
which in turn drove down energy requirements to construct the building (Hanna, 2019). 
Finally, as depicted in Figure 7, an Italian company in 2018 designed and built a 100 square 
meter modular home with AM technology. This modular home was separated into 35 
different parts with printed times of 60 to 90 minutes per part. This speed allowed for the 
entire home to be built within 48 hours. Furthermore, being modular, the building is 
capable of easy expansion as well as relocation (Hanna, 2019). These examples show that 
the international community is making significant strides in AM with regard to increasing 
speed of large-scale construction, having highly specialized structures, reducing energy 
costs for large-scale production, and incorporating modularity into their printing—thus 
allowing for mobility and flexibility in their construction efforts. All these technological 
advances can have significant impacts on Marine Corps implementation of AM throughout 
Marine Corps doctrine. 
 
Figure 5. BOD Construction in Denmark. Source: Hanna (2019). 
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Figure 6. YHNOVA Construction in France. Source: Hanna (2019). 
 
Figure 7. 3D Construction in Italy. Source: Hanna (2019). 
In addition to new materials such as concrete in the application of AM, the civilian 
sector is pursuing the application of AM into the creation of circuitry. In May 2020, 
HENSOLDT, an aerospace company, developed and printed “the first 10-layered printed 
circuit board (PCB) mounting electronic components on both sides of the board” (Elinoff, 
2020). The creation of PCBs with AM demonstrates the technology’s ability to solder at a 
highly precise measurement while also printing on both sides of the PCB. As the 
technology advances, more sophisticated circuitry can be created to allow AM to produce 
not only simple polymer designs but also highly technical circuit boards in a wide range of 
electronic equipment.  
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However, any technological breakthrough will present an element of risk or 
potential vulnerability that adversaries will seek to exploit in an effort to either eliminate 
or diminish the benefit the technological advancement provides. The breakthroughs in AM 
are no different, and adversaries to the United States will seek out vulnerabilities to exploit. 
In 2016, one team of researchers (Zeltmann et al., 2016) presented two potential attack 
vectors to interfere or damage the credibility of AM technology. The first vulnerability 
discussed was embedding a defect to test tensile strength when under load and not under 
load. The test also aimed to determine if the defect could remain undetected from ultrasonic 
inspection. This study found that the defect could remain undetected but presented little 
effect to tensile strength of the item when not under a load. However, tensile strength was 
affected when the item was placed under tension or load. The second vulnerability tested 
was altering the printer direction but leaving the CAD file and materials themselves 
untampered. Figure 8 depicts the various printing directions. The researchers determined 
that the alteration of the direction of the printer had significant effects to tensile strength 
and increased failure rates during strain testing but remained undetected as the printer 
direction was the only variable change (Zeltmann et al., 2016). 
 
Figure 8. Printer Direction Vulnerability Test. Source: Zeltmann et al. (2016). 
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The Fourth Industrial Revolution will have significant impacts on the U.S. military. 
The field of AM is no exception, and the global civilian sector is seeing rapid growth in 
AM technologies. The miniaturization of this technology, such as the Kijenzi 3D printer, 
is only one of several examples that will impact the abilities to conduct a wide range of 
military and civilian operations and not just HADR operations. The large-scale 
construction efforts being undertaken in Europe are also only a few examples of the size 
and scale that AM can achieve. Finally, with the advances of PCB and circuitry printing, 
the range of materials available for print are expanding in scale as well. However, any 
technological advancement presents an element of risk. The Marine Corps can learn from 
the lessons of both miniaturization as well as increased scale of AM technology but also 
must remain vigilant in identifying the risks presented with this new technology.  
B. DOD AND OTHER MILITARY DEPARTMENTS’ USE OF AM 
In 2018, Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis published the U.S. National Defense 
Strategy (NDS). This document, nested underneath the National Security Strategy, 
discussed an emergence from a “strategic atrophy” (DOD, 2018, p. 1) to a new era where 
near peer adversaries were the threat to the U.S. national defense, and the United States 
could not rely on an overwhelming advantage against hostile state and nonstate actors. The 
United States will face threats across all five domains of warfare (air, land, sea, space, and 
cyber). In response to this paradigm shift, Secretary Mattis (2018) directed the joint force 
to be more “lethal, resilient, and rapidly adapting” (p. 1). He stated specific lines of effort 
(LOE) for the DOD to focus their resources, including development of advanced 
autonomous systems and a more resilient and agile logistics network.  
Even though Secretary Mattis did not specifically mention AM technology, in a 
2016 article, Amanda Schrand highlighted how AM could support the development of 
advanced autonomous systems and a more resilient and agile logistics network. She stated 
that 
if such technologies become widespread, the acquisitions process could be 
reduced to its simplest form and become much more agile and rapid via 
AM. For example, printers could be acquired and fielded along with the 
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materials and files responsible for on-demand, in-the-field printing vehicles 
and systems. (Schrand, 2016, p. 85) 
She elaborates that AM can provide relatively simple autonomous vehicles that are 
modular in design, which allows greater operational capabilities at a decreased cost. 
However, she warns that due to the bureaucratic nature of the DOD, synchronized 
integration across the DOD will be a challenge that must be addressed early and 
extensively. Failure to address those concerns will result in decreased AM benefits, duality 
of efforts, and increased costs (Schrand, 2016). 
Prior to the publication of the NDS, the DOD published an AM roadmap in 2016 
to guide and focus its and the military services’ efforts to integrate AM throughout the 
entire department. As seen in Figure 9, the four major subgroups underneath the DOD are 
the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Department of the Army, Department of the Air 
Force, and DON.  
 
Figure 9. DOD AM Roadmap. Source: Department of Defense (DOD, 2016). 
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This document also provided three LOEs for the department and military services. The 
three are maintenance and sustainment, deployed and expeditionary, and new part/system 
acquisition. As depicted in Table 4, the three LOEs have sub-LOEs which cross between 
two or more of the overarching LOEs. 
Table 4. DOD AM LOEs. Source: DOD (2016).  
Line of Effort #1: Maintenance and Sustainment 
LOE #1.1: Manufacture of parts typically produced using conventional manufacturing 
LOE #1.2: AM repair of conventionally manufactured parts 
LOE #1.3: Manufacturing aides for support to conventional manufacturing 
LOE #1.4: Prototyping for rapid innovation and reverse engineering 
Line of Effort #2: Deployed and Expeditionary 
LOE #2.1: Manufacture of parts typically produced using conventional 
manufacturing 
LOE #2.2: AM repair of conventionally manufactured parts 
LOE #2.3: Prototyping for rapid innovation and reverse engineering 
Line of Effort #3: New Part/System Acquisition 
LOE #3.1: New parts/systems designed for AM and manufactured using AM 
LOE #3.2: Manufacturing aides for support to conventional manufacturing 
LOE #3.3: Prototyping for rapid part/system development 
 
LOE #1, Maintenance and Sustainment, addresses how AM can augment traditional 
manufacturing techniques in the manufacturing of repair parts. In 2016, the focus was not 
on cost savings but on how AM could diminish the time requirement to replace the broken 
item. Similar to LOE #1, LOE #2, Deployed and Expeditionary, focuses on the repair and 
replacement of broken items but in austere and remote locations. Location considerations 
further refine this LOE to focus on environmental factors such as weather and the potential 
usage of host nation feedstock materials. Finally, LOE #3, New Part/System Acquisition, 
focuses efforts on integration of AM to assist with manufacturing aides and prototyping of 
new systems (DOD, 2016). These three LOEs are the foundation for follow-on policies and 
directives for the DOD and its military services. 
One source document for the NDS written in 2018 was the U.S. Senate’s National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017, which recommended “the 
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DOD to more aggressively pursue AM capabilities to improve readiness” (Department of 
Defense Inspector General [DODIG], 2019, p. 2). As such, the under secretary of defense 
for acquisition, technology, and logistics (USD[AT&L]) published a congressional report 
on the current progress in integrating AM throughout the DOD (Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [USD(AT&L)], 2017). USD(AT&L) 
selected the Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy (MIBP) as the DOD lead agent for 
AM matters (DODIG, 2019). Also, the USD(AT&L) (2017) acknowledged that the initial 
efforts had been primarily “grass roots” (p. 1), but efforts had been made to a more “higher-
level coordinated activity” (p. 1) for AM integration. One such activity being pursued at 
the DOD level was the certification and qualification of AM parts across the DOD. The 
report also reiterated the importance of the three LOEs laid out in Table 4. However, the 
major focus of the report was a discussion on the duality of efforts across some or all four 
military services and agencies without crossover coordination and synchronization. The 
report’s findings showed that out of the 29 objectives across all military services, 20 of 
those objectives are being pursued separately by all four military services and agencies. As 
such, the report recommended the formation of the Joint Additive Manufacturing Steering 
Group (JAMSG) and Joint Additive Manufacturing Working Group (JAMWG) to 
synchronize AM activities across the four military services and agencies. One significant 
synchronization activity that was recommended was the pursuit of an online portal to store, 
disseminate, and standardize CAD files for DOD-wide usage (USD[AT&L], 2017). 
As stated, each military service provided an internal report to their current activities 
within AM. The DON identified five focus areas for the integration of the three LOEs laid 
out by USD(AT&L). Table 5 depicts those focus areas. 
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Table 5. Five Focus Areas to DON AM Integration. Source: USD(AT&L) 
(2017).  
Five Enterprise-Wide Challenges to AM Integration 
1. Expeditionary and Operational Manufacturing 
2. Qualification and Certification 
3. Digital Thread 
4. Workforce Development 
5. Business Processes 
 
For the first focus area, the DON highlighted several examples of how they are 
using AM to overcome the challenges of logistical support in expeditionary and austere 
environments. One example included the 3DP of an unmanned aircraft system (UAS), 
which only cost $3,000 to produce compared to traditional UASs that cost between 
$200,000 to $250,000. This system simplicity also allowed the same Marine or Sailor to 
print and operate the UAS. Another example highlighted was the 3DP of a helicopter 
helmet visor clip that had a 9-month lead time and cost $300. By manufacturing the item 
with 3DP, the DON reduced the cost per unit to $0.75 and printed 100 clips in 10 days. For 
the second focus area, the DON is concentrating on primarily aircraft components that 
require a high level of qualification and certification and is working to standardize the 
technical data packages (TDP) to be synchronized across the DOD. For the third focus 
area, the Marine Corps has developed an online portal called Marine Maker to store and 
disseminate all CAD files across the Marine Corps. NAVAIR is developing a similar portal 
to store and disseminate CAD files through the USN. For the fourth focus area, the USMC 
has developed mobile training teams and created Marine Maker spaces as stated in 
MARADMIN 594/17. For the fifth and final focus area, the DON stated that they will 
publish a comprehensive AM contracting guide (USD[AT&L], 2017).  
Following the 2017 report, the now under secretary of defense for acquisition and 
sustainment (USD[A&S]), formerly the USD(AT&L), published for the first time an 
interim policy on AM to synchronize efforts across the DOD. This policy was published in 
March 2019 with a revision published in June 2020. The policy primarily discussed the 
roles and responsibilities of the USD(A&S) and the four military services and agencies. 
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One key responsibility tasked to DLA was the creation of the aforementioned online 
repository for all CAD files. However, the policy did not elaborate on the cybersecurity 
considerations or which agency inside the DOD would consider cybersecurity factors for 
AM integration. This seven-page policy only provided high-level tasks and lacked 
important specifics on AM activities within the DOD. 
Following the 2016 roadmap, the 2017 report, and the 2019 policy publication, the 
DODIG published in 2019 a report analyzing the DOD’s efforts in integrating AM. The 
report started by acknowledging that the DOD had been utilizing AM for the past 15 years 
and began collaborating with America Makes in 2012 to coordinate efforts within the DOD 
and to capture AM advances in other governmental agencies, private industry, and 
universities. The DODIG praised several aspects of DOD’s implementation of AM in the 
department. First, it acknowledged that the DOD had expanded its AM capabilities beyond 
maintenance activities into the 3 LOEs discussed in Table 4 (DODIG, 2019). Second, 
DODIG approved of the creation of the JAMSG and JAMWG to address data sharing, 
cybersecurity concerns, and AM part qualification and certification. Third, DODIG 
acknowledged the creation of Joint Additive Manufacturing Model Exchange (JAMMEX), 
a DLA-operated online joint portal for CAD files. Fourth, DODIG approved of the DOD’s 
maintenance focus efforts on low-quantity and high-demand items to realize the most cost 
and maintenance time savings. It provided several examples, including the F-35 landing 
gear door bump stop, which—if broken—traditionally requires the purchase of the entire 
landing gear assembly for $70,000; however, the USN used AM to produce the bump stop 
for only $0.75 and immediately installed the part once printed. Fifth and final, the report 
commended the DOD’s use of AM in mitigating issues with parts not being available from 
original manufacturers or from traditional sources and in improving existing parts 
(DODIG, 2019). 
However, the DODIG report noted several areas of concern. First, the significant 
delay in publishing a DOD-wide policy until 2019 allowed for the four military services 
and agencies to independently develop their own processes, procedures, and systems for 
integrating AM into their organizations. The DODIG noted,  
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For example, both the Air Force and the Navy are using AM to produce 
parts and tools to sustain the C-130 Hercules aircraft (C-130). By not 
sharing information regarding the design, type of material used, and other 
technical data, both Military Services could be working on the development 
of the same part or developing a part that has previously been engineered 
by the other Military Service. (DODIG, 2019, p. 16)  
This created the duality of efforts that the 2017 report to Congress highlighted and 
that Schrand (2016) foresaw in her article. Second, even though the DODIG commended 
the DLA for creating JAMMEX, it criticized the DLA for not providing the military 
services with the policies and procedures for integrating their own repositories into the 
JAMMEX repository as well as what materials were used, a common stock numbers list, 
and file formats to be used. For example, “The Air Force is using an Access database and 
Excel spreadsheets to track AM parts produced or waiting for approval” (DODIG, 2019, 
p. 15). Third and finally, the DODIG report highlighted a lack of tracking AM systems 
throughout the DOD into one repository. The DODIG stated that this lack would result in 
duality of assets being co-located geographically or services using internal AM assets to 
their service while other military services might have AM systems geographically closer 
to the point of need (DODIG, 2019). As of June 2020, the interim policy still does not 
dictate to track AM systems throughout the DOD in one repository. 
In addition to these criticisms, the DODIG provided a list of four overarching 
recommendations. First, military services and agencies should use standard formats for 
reporting AM data. This reporting should include data on parts produced using AM and 
AM equipment by military services as well as the amount spent on AM by both military 
services and the DLA. Second, the under secretary of defense for research and engineering 
(USD[R&E]) should develop policy to standardize the cataloguing of AM parts. 
Furthermore, USD(R&E) should require all military services and agencies to use a single 
repository for AM CAD files. One such system that would fulfill this requirement would 
be JAMMEX. Third, USD(R&E) should require military services and DLA to require all 
subordinate guidance and policies on AM to include language regarding contracting, 
acquisitions, logistics, and senior management officials to receive AM training. Fourth, the 
military services, including the Marine Corps, should task their respective AM leads to 
develop a process for tracking and updating a complete list of AM parts and parts waiting 
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for approval, as well as the ability to share this list with other services. DODIG did state 
that JAMMEX could fulfill this recommendation as long as the military services’ own 
repositories could replicate with the JAMMEX repository. Finally, the DODIG 
recommends that all military services and agencies identify the appropriate funding levels 
for AM pursuits and appropriate population size for of personnel pursuing AM initiatives 
(DODIG, 2019). 
In parallel to the DOD’s implementation of AM, the DON and the USN have also 
been implementing policies and guidance on DON-wide implementation of AM. One such 
DON policy, published in 2017, was the DON’s Additive AM Implementation Plan V2.0. 
This document would have two overarching goals of increasing readiness and sustainment 
as well as enhancing warfighter capabilities. In an effort to achieve these goals, the 
document lists five objectives. First, the DON will develop and implement a process to 
rapidly qualify and certify AM parts. Second, the DON will create a secure repository of 
AM parts to provide process integration across the DON for AM data, infrastructure, and 
tools. As of 2019, “The Navy uses the JTDI [Joint Technical Data Integration], Excel 
spreadsheets, and an Access database to track AM parts” (DODIG, 2019, p. 15). Third, the 
DON will create a training and certification program that will be available to all DON 
personnel. Fourth, all subsequent guidance and policies will consider and address business 
practices, contracting, intellectual property, and legal and liability considerations, when 
applicable. Fifth, the DON will seek to employ AM in operational environments and drive 
manufacturing to as close to the point of need as possible (Secretary of the Navy, 2017).  
Similar to the DOD, the DON has seen the benefits of AM when addressing the 
obsolescence of parts (Schrand, 2016) and the ability to decrease maintenance costs and 
time. The DODIG noted,  
The Navy used AM to produce an MH-60R Sea Hawk Helicopter (MH-
60R) sonar system cover, which was not always available in the supply 
system. The AM-produced sonar system cover eliminated corrosion of the 
traditionally manufactured cover, reduced the lead time from 2 years to 1 
week, and decreased cost from $ [redacted] to $ [redacted] per cover. 
(DODIG, 2019, p. 9) 
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One unique benefit of AM that primarily supports DON operations is the expanded 
ability to operate within the Chinese weapon engagement zone (WEZ; Office of the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology, 2019). As seen in figures 
10 and 11, the Chinese WEZ presents both global and regional obstacles to DON SLOCs. 
“This aggressive pursuit of AM will ultimately enable a future ‘Self-Sustaining Naval 
Force’ that is free of vulnerable lines of communication and dedicated logistics assets” 
(Secretary of the Navy, 2017, p. 5). 
 
Figure 10. Chinese WEZ Global Impact. Source: Missile Defense Project (2020). 
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Figure 11. Chinese WEZ Regional Impact. Source: Missile Defense Project 
(2020). 
From Table 6, Class I, III, and V sources of supply require significant quantities of raw 
materials. Thus, the benefits of AM to these classes of supply in expeditionary or austere 
environments would be limited. AM could provide significant benefits to other classes of 
supply, but most specifically, Class VIII and IX.  
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Table 6. Classes of Supply. Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff (2019). 
Class Number Class Description 
Class I Subsistence 
Class II General Support Items 
Class III Petroleum, Oils, Lubricants (POL) 
Class IV Construction/Barrier 
Class V Ammunition 
Class VI Personal Demand Items 
Class VII Major End-Items 
Class VIII Medical Material/Medical Repair 
Class IX Repair Parts (Less Medical Special Repair Parts) 
Class X Code as Zero (0): Materials Not Included in Class I–IX 
 
Even though AM provides unique benefits to the DON, AM also has its own DON-
specific challenges. Once such challenge is printing aboard ships while underway. Even 
though 3DP has occurred aboard ships such as the USS Essex (CV 9) “to demonstrate the 
ability to additively develop and produce shipboard items such as oil reservoir caps, drain 
covers, training aids, and tools to achieve performance improvements” (Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 2015, p. 20), environmental factors have significant impacts 
to printing aboard ship. Such factors include humidity, vibrations, and motion that could 
affect the quality of the printed item (GAO, 2015).  
The DOD and DON literature highlights that the Marine Corps–owned AM 
initiatives must be nested under both DOD and DON policy for the Marine Corps to truly 
maximize the benefits of AM. Without considering these policies and guidance, issues will 
arise such as duality of efforts and increased costs (Schrand, 2016). These issues will 
ultimately affect the Marine Corps’ ability to fulfill Secretary Mattis’s (2018) directive of 
being a “lethal, resilient, and rapidly adapting” (p. 1) force in readiness.  
C. MARINE CORPS’ AM INITIATIVES 
As the previous chapter of this research captured, the primary source documents 
for AM integration in the Marine Corps are the four MARADMINs and MCO 4700.4. The 
first MARADMIN was published in September 2016, and the MCO was published in 
March 2020. During this period of time and slightly before, the Marine Corps had 
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published other literature and research, conducted various projects and exercises, and 
created and expanded the AMOC’s AM efforts throughout the Marine Corps. All of these 
actions sought to expand AM’s reach to fulfill the DON’s overarching goals of increasing 
readiness and sustainment as well as enhancing warfighter capabilities (Secretary of the 
Navy, 2017) and adapting the Marines Corps logistics systems to be more responsive and 
lethal—in line with Secretary Mattis’s (2018) NDS guidance.  
The first primary piece of literature for the Marine Corps’ integration of AM came 
from R. W. Appleton & Company Inc., which provided an overview of AM initiatives in 
2014. Even though it is a dated review of the Marine Corps’ progress, the report highlighted 
some points and issues that still are relevant. First, Appleton (2014) stated,  
Unlike traditional manufacturing methods that require expensive and time 
consuming tooling setup, A/M goes straight from CAD drawing to the 
printer with only a software interface. The per-item cost of one is no more 
than for one thousand. Economy of scale is less important. The converse of 
this is that for large production runs of identical items, traditional methods 
usually remain the best choice. (p. 10) 
Second, as of 2014, the preponderance of 3D printing companies are not 
headquartered in the United States, which presents significant security concerns when 
employing commercial printers for military and national defense use. Third, Appleton 
stated, 
Because of the elimination of design constraints, it is possible to 
manufacture much stronger items weighing less than their traditionally 
made counterparts. And because of the near elimination of waste, it is 
possible to make them at reasonable cost. (Appleton, 2014, p. 10) 
Fourth, as AM requires the TDP in the form of a CAD file, acquisitions of new 
weapon systems will require the additional purchase of the TDP with the system, which 
many suppliers will be resistant to providing. However, that additional purchase “would 
more than offset the price tag” (Appleton, 2014, p. 24). Fifth and finally, the purchasing of 
these CAD files will allow the storage of files in lieu of physical end-items or parts. This 
change in storage will either greatly diminish or remove entirely the employment of a 
proverbial iron mountain stockpile (Appleton, 2014). Even though dated, these five lessons 
still bear relevancy to AM initiatives today. 
33 
Other literature includes DC I&L’s 2017 roadmap, where then DC I&L, Lieutenant 
General Michael G. Dana, stated that the primary classes of supply transported through the 
Marine Corps supply system are Class I, III, and V (Deputy Commandant for Installations 
and Logistics [DC I&L], 2017). As previously discussed regarding classes of supply, even 
though AM would not benefit those three classes, DC I&L and the Marine Corps still see 
the advantages that AM technology could offer. As such, LtGen Dana went on to state,  
Emerging technologies provide great promise, and will give us [the Marine 
Corps] the ability to offset enemy capabilities by resupplying faster, 
producing on-demand parts and outmaneuvering our enemies on the 
battlefield. Our NexLog capability development efforts are focused on three 
key thrust areas: additive manufacturing, smart logistics and unmanned 
capabilities. (DC I&L, 2017, p. 7) 
He elaborated to say that AM would allow for the flattening of the supply chain to 
place logistics requirements at the point of need (DC I&L, 2017) for those classes of supply 
outside of I, III, and V. 
In addition to these reports and literature on the benefits of AM, the Marines Corps 
has conducted exercises and projects to further expand AM’s capabilities for the Marine 
Corps. Several examples of increasing readiness and sustainment already exist, including 
the printing of H-1 helmet visor clips, rifle optic flash covers, and other small plastic repair 
parts and the usage of hybrid manufacturing, which is a combination of AM and traditional 
or subtractive manufacturing with metal material. Furthermore, other examples of 
enhancing warfighter capabilities are the acquisitions of lightweight polymer .50 caliber 
ammunition and Exercise Burgeon Strike, which sought to assess the training and 
execution of printing large scale concrete items and structures.  
Similar to the F-35 landing gear door bump stop and the MH-60R Sea Hawk sonar 
system cover, the Marine Corps has also seen AM benefits to both cost and time for 
repairing low-quantity, high-demand items. As previously mentioned, one example 
includes the use of AM to print helicopter helmet visor clips—reducing maintenance 
downtime from 270 days to 10 days and decreasing cost from $300 to $0.75 per helmet 
visor clip (DODIG, 2019). Another example includes the printing of rifle optic flash 
covers. Traditionally these items cost $54 each, but when printed using AM, they only cost 
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$0.57 (Douglas, 2020). A third example includes the use of a LulzBot TAZ 6 3D printer 
aboard the USS John P. Murtha (LPD 26) and USS Boxer (LHD 4) (Fuentes, 2019). While 
aboard ships, Combat Logistics Battalion 11 Marines printed spotting scope caps, 
subscriber identify module (SIM) card trays for satellite phones, and several other items. 
Even though these items were relatively cheap to manufacture, the decrease in maintenance 
downtime allowed these items to quickly protect other high valued systems, which—in 
turn—still saved significant dollars by printing these items on demand in a timeframe of 
hours or days instead of waiting for them to be transported to the ship, which would have 
taken weeks or months (Fuentes, 2019). Finally, the Marine Corps is pursuing how hybrid 
manufacturing can benefit readiness and sustainment (Zelinski, 2019). Benefits of AM 
production are the decrease in waste or scrap and the ability to produce the part outside of 
the production facility, but a benefit of subtractive or traditional manufacturing is the 
precision that milling and drilling provide, which AM cannot do solely. By combining both 
of these technologies into one system, the benefits of each are realized while diminishing 
or removing entirely the drawbacks of the standalone technology (Zelinski, 2019). 
Furthermore, hybrid manufacturing does not just increase readiness and sustainment but 
also increases warfighter capabilities by allowing for alteration of items for increased 
benefits and production capabilities of those items in an operational environment if the 
appropriate materials are on hand. 
Another example of AM increasing warfighter capabilities is the acquisition of 
lightweight polymer .50 caliber ammunition (Athey, 2020). This $10 million acquisition 
project seeks to replace the metal casings and metal ammunition containers with a lighter 
weight polymer casing and container, respectively. The contractor will also replace the 
metal links with a lighter-weight nylon link. The reduction in weight for each ammunition 
container will be approximately 20 pounds. This reduction will not only allow Marines to 
carry less weight or more ammunition at the same weight requirement, it will also reduce 
lift requirements such as the number of vehicles or helicopters transporting large quantities 
of the ammunition. Thus, AM does provide benefits in the transportation of Class I, III, 
and V by producing Class V at the point of need but then making the transportation of 
Class V less demanding on the supply chain with the reduction of weight. Additionally, as 
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the polymers and nylon absorb less heat than metal, the weapons system itself will remain 
cooler while firing prolonged bursts, thus diminishing the risks of overheating or jamming 
the weapons system (Athey, 2020). 
Another example of increasing warfighters’ capabilities is seen during Exercise 
Burgeon Strike. This exercise was a 3-day joint exercise between the USMC, the United 
States Air Force (USAF), and the United States Army Corps of Engineers. Its objective 
was to test whether untrained Marines and Airmen could be trained to construct concrete 
buildings in only a few days (Jagoda et al., 2020). The exercise was subdivided into two 
parts. The first part was a training program for the personnel on the AM equipment that 
would be used in the second part. The second part was the actual construction by the newly 
trained personnel. “While four of the eight Marine and Air Force personnel in attendance 
had prior experience with the 3D-printed construction process, none of the personnel had 
ever written G-code” (Jagoda et al., 2020, p. 3). G-code is the software language used to 
print the concrete buildings. All personnel were successfully trained in only 1 day on both 
the equipment and the G-code software. The next 2 days consisted of the actual printing of 
the dragon’s teeth (as depicted in Figure 12) and an entry control point, barracks hut, and 
defensive fighting position (as depicted in Figure 13).  
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Figure 12. Dragon Teeth Dimensions. Source: Jagoda et al. (2020). 
 
Figure 13. Entry Control Point, Barracks Hut, and Defensive Fighting Position. 
Source: Jagoda et al. (2020). 
The printer used was an Automated Construction of Expeditionary Structures 
(ACES) Lite 2, which is a prototype, deployable 3D printer that is capable of being 
deployed in 30 minutes by a trained team of four personnel but only requiring a minimum 
of two personnel for operations (Jagoda et al., 2020). To ensure higher quality printing, a 
bagged concrete material mix was used to ensure consistency of materials throughout the 
entire printing process. Jagoda et al. (2020) noted,  
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The downside of using a bagged material mix for 3D printing is that it could 
be difficult, expensive, or time-consuming to procure in a remote, isolated, 
or expeditionary environment, depending on the location. The benefits of 
more consistent material performance must be weighed against the cost and 
logistics trade-offs. (p. 5) 
The dragon’s teeth were each printed in under 1 hour and were able to be 
transported after 2 days to allow the material to dry. If made conventionally, the dragon’s 
teeth would have taken from approximately 3 to 6 hours. Unfortunately, because a bagged 
material mix was used, the cost for an AM dragon’s tooth was $750—which is more 
expensive than a conventionally manufactured dragon’s tooth, which would cost $500. The 
majority of the cost increase came from the usage of the bagged material. Thus, one way 
to offset the cost increase would be to use the bagged material mix for the frame while 
using a cheaper material as filler (Jagoda et al., 2020). Regardless, the cost savings seen in 
maintenance repair parts will likely not be achieved to the same scale with 3DP concrete 
buildings. 
Even though this AM exercise did not achieve cost savings, several other benefits 
were documented by manufacturing these concrete items with AM technology. First, an 
“advantage of 3D-printed construction over conventional construction is the elimination of 
the need for formwork, which in turn reduces material consumption, construction time, 
labor demand, environmental impact of materials, and cost” (Jagoda et al., 2020, p. 6). The 
costs savings mentioned in this quote refer to the cost savings with the decrease in labor as 
well as the decrease in environmental costs when compared to traditional manufacturing 
techniques. Second, AM construction allows for continuous printing, with limited time 
needed for cleaning and maintenance. Third, AM is more autonomous when compared to 
conventional construction. This automation in turn results in reduced labor demand and 
diminished human error per item (Jagoda et al., 2020).  
The last major Marine Corps AM effort between 2016 and 2020 was the transfer of 
the lead AM agent from NexLog–AM to the AMOC. The AMOC was established in 
January 2019 and reports directly to MCSC (Audette, 2019). In concert with Installation 
and Logistics (I&L) personnel, the AMOC has create six overarching goals of AM in the 
Marine Corps as depicted in Table 7 (Douglas, 2020). One key goal, Goal #3, seeks to 
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drive innovation from the bottom up, while still providing centralized control of 
implementation as seen with the publication of MCO 4700.4 (Douglas, 2020). 
Table 7. Marine Corps AM Overarching Goals. Source: Douglas (2020). 
Goal Number Goal Description 
Goal #1 Speed and Flexibility: In-field fabrication close to the forward edge 
of battle. 
Goal #2 Adaptability: Rapid prototyping for emergent needs 
Goal #3 Warfighter Innovation: Designs led bottom-up 
Goal #4 Risk Reduction: Overcome obsolescent and long lead time parts 
Goal #5 Customizable: Bespoke solutions for missions or people 
Goal #6 Ability: Unique designs for performance and efficiency 
 
Two significant LOEs in achieving these six goals are the creation of programs of record 
(PORs) for the tactical fabrication (TACFAB) and expeditionary fabrication (XFAB) 
systems (Douglas, 2020) and the management of the Marine Maker CAD file repository 
(Audette, 2019). 
As seen in Figures 14 and 15, respectively, the TACFAB and XFAB offer varying 
levels of organizational and intermediate-level AM support in austere or remote locations. 
39 
 
Figure 14. LulzBot TAZ 6 3D Printer (TACFAB). Source: Fuentes (2019). 
 
Figure 15. XFAB Expandable Shelter. Source: Randolph (2017). 
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For the USS Murtha and USS Boxer deployment in 2019, the LulzBot TAZ 6 3D 
printer served as the TACFAB (Fuentes, 2019). The XFAB is similar in design to other 
Marine Corps expandable shelters, and when fully expanded it measures 20 feet by 20 feet 
and weighs 10,500 pounds. The system is designed to be set up by a team of four Marines, 
taking between 2 to 3 hours. This system will house several 3D printers, a scanner, and a 
CAD software system to create not only physical items but create and provide CAD files 
in remote environments (Randolph, 2017). Also, the Marine Corps is pursuing to make the 
TACFAB and XFAB POR in FY2019 and FY2020 (Douglas, 2020). The TACFAB’s 
design, depicted in Figure 14, is not finalized. The XFAB design will be identical or similar 
to the one depicted in Figure 15. Once both designs are finalized, initial fielding is 
scheduled for FY2021 with 17 XFABs and 169 TACFAB systems being delivered 
throughout the Marine Corps (Douglas, 2020). 
The other initiative the AMOC cell is pursing is the expansion of the Marine Maker 
CAD file repository. This website is open facing to the World Wide Web and allows for 
username and password access to those users with accounts. These accounts require a 
military or DOD email to authenticate. The website does not require the usage of a 
Common Access Card (CAC) for ease of use for those Marines not on a Marine Corps or 
DOD network. The Marine Maker portal does replicate with the JAMMEX repository 
(Douglas, 2020). However, as of January 2020, the repository “cannot handle the volume 
of data currently stored” (Douglas, 2020, p. 8), and the AMOC is pursuing another digital 
repository called the Digital Manufacturing Data Vault (DMDV) to handle the large 
quantities of files (Audette, 2019) with that repository becoming a POR in FY2024 or 
FY2025 (Douglas, 2020).  
The civilian and international community, the DOD and the DON, and the Marine 
Corps have taken great strides to increase the capacity of AM in their respective 
organizations and to extend the influence AM can have beyond maintenance support. AM 
is not a new technology. “It has evolved from an interesting hobby to an industry producing 
a wide range of products from an ever-growing list of materials” (Hammes, 2017, p. 101). 
All of the previously mentioned literature and initiatives in this chapter have had and will 
continue to have significant impacts on how the Marine Corps incorporates AM. MCO 
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4700.4 has replaced the aforementioned MARADMINs to be the focal source of AM 
knowledge and guidance in the Marine Corps. As such, further reviews of this order must 
take into account the previously mentioned literature and initiatives to truly capture the 
benefits of AM in the Marine Corps.  
D. MCO 4700.4 REVIEW 
MCO 4700.4 was signed in March 2020. This document’s goal was to align with 
the DOD’s interim policy of 2019 and the DON’s implementation plan of 2017. The order 
was to replace previous MARADMINs discussing AM integration and expand upon the 
framework those documents had established—with the exception of MARADMIN 209/18, 
as that document applies specifically to air assets and AM integration. The order is broken 
into two parts, the operational order (OPORD) and two enclosures. The OPORD follows 
the traditional format of situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, and 
command and signal (SMEAC). The two enclosures include (a) a list of references and (b) 
six chapters addressing the integration of AM. The chapters are introduction, 
implementation, manufacturing process, aviation, legal considerations, and training. This 
research does not seek to address the validity of the structure of the order, but the researcher 
concurs that it follows similar Marine Corps orders, which provides familiarity to the 
intended audience of Marine Corps officers and enlisted Marines.  
As stated, the first part of the order is formatted using the SMEAC model. The 
situation section highlights two key elements. First, it states, “AM is a secondary source of 
supply that improves equipment readiness through production at the point of need” (DC 
I&L, 2020, p. 1). This point emphasizes that AM will augment—not replace—traditional 
manufacturing, and AM is an effort to place more logistics capabilities at the point of need. 
Second, this chapter acknowledges the previously mentioned guidance from the DOD and 
the DON as source documents. The mission section is traditionally the “heart” of any order 
and this order is no exception. The mission statement reads, “Commanders at all levels 
shall employ and develop additive manufacturing to its fullest extent possible in order to 
improve combat readiness in garrison and during expeditionary operations” (DC I&L, 
2020, p. 1). The part of the mission statement regarding commanders at all levels highlights 
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the drive for a bottom-up approach, as seen in Table 7’s Goal #3 (Douglas, 2020). The last 
part of the mission statement regarding expeditionary operations highlights Table 7’s Goal 
#1 of conducting manufacturing at the point of need (Douglas, 2020). Following the 
situation and mission section is the execution section, which traditionally is the largest part 
of any OPORD. 
The execution section is broken into two parts. First is the commander’s intent and 
concept of operations, and second is the tasking statements. Commander’s intent and 
concept of operations further expands upon the previously mentioned mission statement, 
while the tasking statements of this section specifically name individuals or organizations 
and assign them specific tasks. For commander’s intent, the intent is “to reduce 
maintenance cycle times, supply chain backlogs, and place manufacturing capabilities at 
or near the point of need” (DC I&L, 2020, p. 1). For the concept of operations, the focus is 
for commanders at all levels to create a “‘Marine Maker’ culture” (DC I&L, 2020, p. 2), 
which seeks to receive AM input from all Marines and military occupational specialties 
(MOS). This maker culture in warfare is not the first time in history that Soldiers have 
fabricated and manufactured in austere and remote environments. The Roman legionnaires 
were just as effective warriors as they were manufacturers, which allowed them a strategic 
advantage against the far larger-numbering Gallic foes in the conquest of modern-day 
France (Carlin, 2017). As Marines continue to fight abroad, this capability and mindset has 
again strategic implications for the Marine Corps’ future success against foes that 
outnumber the Marine Corps.  
The tasking statements include 10 people and organizations that are involved in 
AM integration. However, five are critical stakeholders in this research. First, DC I&L 
tasks themselves or, more importantly, their staff with the following tasks. They need to 
serve as the AM lead in the Marine Corps but task a separate entity to serve as the lead 
agent who at the time of this order is the AMOC. Also, DC I&L again tasks themselves to 
be the Marine Corps advocate and participant in all joint initiatives such as the JAMSG 
and Navy Additive Manufacturing Executive Committee to ensure that Marine Corps 
policies are aligned with higher headquarters guidance. This taskings allow DC I&L and 
their staff to be the outward face for AM for the Marine Corps, while the lead agent can 
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work internally and downward into the Marine Corps to provide guidance and direction. 
This duality between DC I&L and MCSC (through the AMOC) will create clear roles and 
responsibilities for both organizations. Second, Deputy Commandant, Combat 
Development and Integration (DC CD&I) is tasked with ensuring that Total Force 
Structure Management System (TFSMS) data contains accurate information on units’ AM 
equipment inventory. The TFSMS portal stores all Marine Corps units’ tables of 
organization (TO) and tables of equipment (TE). The TO is not a personnel tracker. This 
document contains a list of all Marine Corps billets that a unit is authorized to have and not 
which individual Marines make up the unit. The TE is similar to the TO, but it lists all the 
equipment a unit rates instead of what the unit actually has on hand. Third, Deputy 
Commandant, Information (DC I) is tasked with cybersecurity. This order specifies that 
those cybersecurity tasks are to develop an authority to operate (ATO) for AM assets on 
the Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN), develop a standardized format for the 
acquisitions of AM hardware and software, support MCSC with the digital repository and 
its security, and—in conjunction with Marine Corps Installations Command (MCICOM)—
ensure appropriate funding to allocate network infrastructure in support of AM efforts. The 
only specific cybersecurity statement or reference came with the two words of “security 
measures” (DC I&L, 2020, p. 3). Fourth, MCSC serves as the lead agent and “technical 
authority for all ground applications of AM” (DC I&L, 2020, p. 4). This includes the 
creation and management of the digital repository that must also integrate with other 
military services, DLA, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) repositories. 
Fifth, TECOM reviews all entry-level training programs and sustainment courses to 
integrate AM training throughout the Marine Corps. As for the last two sections of the 
OPORD and the first enclosure, they are administrative in nature and not necessarily vital 
to this research. 
Following the OPORD and list of references, the second enclosure provides AM 
policy and is broken into six chapters with the first being the introduction. The introduction 
highlights the current logistics issues facing Marine Corps units such as long lead times, 
expensive repair parts, obsolescence of gear or lack of OEMs, and the inability to rapidly 
adapt to evolving threats on the battlefield. The introduction then goes on to state that AM 
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could mitigate or remove these logistical problems. The introduction also provides 
definitions as well as varying types of 3DP options to provide a baseline for all Marines to 
mitigate misinterpretation between different units and organizations in the collaboration of 
AM across the Marine Corps.  
The next section of the introductory chapter states the four levels of AM operations. 
First, organizational operations are the lowest level and are placed at battalions or 
squadrons operating in austere and remote locations. These units are fielded the TACFAB 
to provide organic, point of need, polymer fabrication. Second, intermediate level 
operations are conducted with traditional intermediate maintenance activity (IMA) units, 
such as maintenance battalions, where trained machinists operate the XFAB system. The 
XFAB can provide polymer and limited metal fabrication capabilities. Depot level 
operations serve as the highest tier of operational AM activities and are organic to Marine 
Corps Logistics Command (LOGCOM). This AM capability provides fabrication of 
specialized polymers, specialized metal alloys, and other unique materials. Fourth, 
installation operations serve as the garrison capability in support of the three other 
operational levels. This level contains the Marine Maker spaces, and these spaces are 
placed aboard Marine Corps bases and installations where appropriate. This level of 
operations also provides an educational component with trained personnel staffing the 
Marine Maker spaces to further foster an innovate and adaptive culture with which Marines 
can test new concepts and ideas for AM application. Finally, these Marine Maker spaces 
have “computerized numerical controlled (CNC) mills/routers, water jets, laser cutters, 
microcontrollers, and electronic sensors” (DC I&L, 2020, p. 1-4) to assist in the innovate 
ideas and concepts from all Marines.  
The introductory chapter also provides a brief description of construction-scale 
additive manufacturing (CSAM), discussing AM manufacturing with concrete as seen in 
Exercise Burgeon Strike. However, this subsection of the introductory chapter provides 
only an overview of this capability and not specific recommendations or resources for the 
employment of CSAM as the Jagoda et al. (2020) article provided.  
The last subsection of this chapter addresses AM machines on the MCEN and the 
digital repository. First, this last subsection states that AM machines are not authorized on 
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the MCEN, which has impeded AM integration. Furthermore, the order states that AM 
machines are similar to multifunction devices (MFD), which already have an ATO, thus 
AM machines should easily receive an ATO approval rating. An example of an MFD 
currently approved for the MCEN is a copier, printer, scanner machine. However, as seen 
in the research of Zeltmann et al. (2016), if a 3D printer changes the direction of its printing, 
it will have significant impacts on the quality of the printed item. Conversely, if a 
traditional paper print changes direction, the print quality will remain the same. Thus, the 
orders claim of AM printers and MFDs being similar is inaccurate and could lead to 
unnecessary assumed risks. Furthermore, this subsection ends with the uniform resource 
locator (URL) for both the ground and aviation repositories. 
Chapter 2 discusses the implementation of AM at an enterprise level as well as a 
ground- and aviation-specific level. Similar to the tasking statements in the SMEAC order, 
tasking statements are used for implementation guidance. For the enterprise-level tasks, 
they are separated by functional areas instead of by people and organizations. Once the 
order begins to discuss the ground- and aviation-specific tasks, those tasks are broken down 
by people and organizations as seen in the SMEAC order. Thus, this entire order has three 
different sections covering tasks, which are broken into two different formats. 
The enterprise-level tasks have four functional areas. First, the policy functional 
area discusses the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between all the Marine Corps 
organizations involved with AM and tasks MCSC as the lead agent through the AMOC. It 
also states that DC I&L will lead any edits and revisions to this order. Second, the training 
functional area tasks DC CD&I with creating training programs for entry level as well as 
sustainment programs even though earlier TECOM was tasked. Also, TECOM is not 
mentioned as a support effort either in this portion of the order. Though DC CD&I and 
TECOM are different organizations, they both have an overlapping responsibility for the 
training and education of AM in the Marine Corps. Third, the resourcing functional area 
discusses the building of Marine Maker spaces led by DC I&L and the management of the 
digital repository lead by MCSC. It does state that the current repository will be replaced 
by the DMDV as a POR in FY2021. Also, this digital repository must replicate with other 
military services and coalition partners. Finally, the order includes tasks for MCSC to 
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increase the accessibility of AM software on the MCEN and identifies DC I as a supporting 
entity—not the lead. Fourth, the last functional area is legal considerations. Though 
important, this research does not focus on the legal considerations of AM, as other research 
has been conducted to address this topic.  
Following the enterprise-level tasks, the ground-specific tasks address all key 
stakeholders and their responsibilities. This list duplicates some of the tasks mentioned 
under the execution section of the OPORD but primarily expands upon the role of MCSC. 
The tasks reiterate the importance of the digital repository and standardization of AM 
systems such as the TACFAB and XFAB. However, the order discussed MCSC’s and the 
AMOC’s expanded roles in three key areas. First, the AMOC must establish a 24-hour help 
desk to respond to AM queries. Second, the AMOC must develop a prototyping lab to test 
and validate designs from Marine Corps units. Third, the AMOC must establish 
relationships with civilian industries to expand Marine Corps AM capabilities and 
capacities. With this expanded role defined and the MOU established, MCSC through the 
AMOC is positioned to effectively lead AM efforts within the Marine Corps. 
Chapter 3 addresses the manufacturing process. It discusses what items each level 
of operations can and cannot print as well as the role of getting CAD files approved. As 
the level increases so too does the ability to create and print more parts of varying materials. 
This order specifically and effectively addresses each level’s authorities. This chapter then 
discusses in detail the approval process for CAD files as depicted in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16. Marine Corps CAD File Approval Process. Source: DC I&L (2020). 
The approval process also discusses in detail the categorization of CAD files into bins by 
color and outlines who is authorized to print from each bin. Green bin files are those 
approved for printing and can be printed by any organization with the appropriate AM 
system and materials. Yellow bin files are those in the initial design stage and have not yet 
been submitted in the formal approval process to the AMOC. Blue bin files are similar to 
yellow bin files with the exception that the file has now entered the formal approval process 
with the AMOC. Red bin files are those determined not authorized for printing. The order 
does specify that all files, including even red bin files, can be printed by the appropriate 
level command if the risk is deemed sufficient in supporting the operational need. The last 
part of this chapter discusses the labeling and filing of CAD files for ease of tracking and 
documentation. 
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Chapter 6 is the final chapter of the policy and discusses the training considerations 
for AM. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss aviation and legal considerations, respectively, which—
although important—are not the focus of this research. Chapter 6 discusses the four levels 
of training as seen in Table 8. This chapter again highlights the importance that TECOM 
will have in incorporating training both in entry-level and sustainment courses for Marines 
of all MOSs and not just machinists. 
Table 8. MCO 4700.4 Levels of Training. Source: DC I&L (2020). 
Training Level Description 
Familiarization 
Training 
Introductory awareness training for all hands consisting of AM 
capabilities and program familiarization. 
Level 1: Operator Level 1 training consists of teaching Marines to operate printing equipment and print approved items.  
Level 2: Incidental 
Programmer 
Level 2 training consists of CAD, operation of a slicer program, 
printing noncritical materials, performing basic maintenance on 
printing equipment, and submitting technical data for approval.  
Level 3: Formally 
Trained 
Level 3 training consists of advanced CAD programming, reverse 
engineering, structural analysis, equipment maintenance, and 
material selection.  
 
MCO 4700.4 took DOD and DON guidance to formally provide the entire Marine 
Corps with the guidance and policy for implementing AM in their respective units and 
organizations. The chapter regarding the manufacturing process went into specific and 
effective guidance on how to create and approve CAD files. Furthermore, the training 
chapter and philosophy of focusing on all Marines not just a select few is another proactive 
and sound decision. Certain areas can be expanded upon such as the TACFAB being more 
expeditionary as well as a tailoring of the tasking statements. Those areas are relatively 
minor and easier to address. However, a larger concern is the lack of a robust cybersecurity 
plan. This lack of cybersecurity offers vulnerabilities for adversaries to exploit and mitigate 




IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
MCO 4700.4’s guidance attempts to empower all Marines and their commanders 
to integrate AM as a secondary source of supply. In achieving this primary objective, MCO 
4700.4 appears to achieve this objective. The order seeks to partner with civilian and 
international partners as well as align with published guidance from the DOD and the DON. 
Furthermore, the order seeks to expand upon the achievements of prior Marine Corps 
initiatives instead of acting as a replacement. Even though the order does achieve its 
primary objective, areas can be improved or expanded to further assist those commanders 
and Marines in more effectively integrating AM into their routine operations. The first 
subsection of this chapter addresses the primary research question: What is additive 
manufacturing’s current position within the Marine Corps and what areas could be 
improved? The next two sections cover the subsequent two secondary research questions. 
First, What unique risks does AM present to the Marine Corps? Second, What specific 
opportunities does AM provide the Marine Corps that they are not pursuing or are not 
pursuing to their fullest extent?  
One analytical tool that this research uses to assist in the analysis of the data when 
compared to the research questions is a report card–style rubric. As depicted in Table 9, 
the color format is similar to Slate’s (2004) discussion on grading contractors during source 
selection. The overall objective of this analysis is for decision-makers to incorporate this 
analysis and the conclusions into the next revision of MCO 4700.4.  
Table 9. Grading Rubric. Source: Slate (2004). 








A. WHAT IS ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING’S CURRENT POSITION 
WITHIN THE MARINE CORPS, AND WHAT AREAS COULD BE 
IMPROVED? 
On March 23, 2020, MCO 4700.4 became the source document for AM policy for 
ground equipment. It transitioned the Marine Corps from official message traffic through 
MARADMINS to official AM policy. In the absence of thorough guidance from the DOD, 
the Marine Corps has effectively taken initial steps to properly integrate AM. Several areas 
throughout the order demonstrate a programmatic approach to AM by driving down cost, 
decreasing time requirements, and increasing performance while also reducing risk to an 
acceptable level for on-site commanders to make AM decisions. First, the cultural 
undertone of MCO 4700.4 emphasizes the need for a bottoms-up approach that is led by 
the next generation of Marines to truly make every Marine a “maker” of supply items that 
are necessary for mission accomplishment. Second, risk is placed on the lowest level 
commander instead of decision-makers in the National Capital Region. Third, AM 
education and training opportunities will not only inspire all Marines, but also synchronize 
efforts across the Marine Corps by establishing an AM training baseline. Fourth, the bin 
system of AM CAD files allows for flexibility in the adoption of AM technology. Fifth, 
the tiered approach of organizational, intermediate, depot, and installation levels for AM 
equipment places AM not only at the point of need, but throughout the supply chain. 
Finally, the XFAB and TACFAB systems allow for tailored solutions to operational 
requirements.  
1. Cultural Undertone of MCO 4700.4 
MCO 4700.4’s mission statement calls for commanders at all levels to create a 
“‘Marine Maker’ culture” (DC I&L, 2020, p. 2) within their organizations. The order seeks 
to inspire Marines of all ranks and MOSs to be a maker. If harnessed properly, this new 
ability will make the Marine Corps a more lethal force by placing “production at the point 
of need” (DC I&L, 2020, p. 1). The order is not seeking AM to replace other systems but 
to augment established logistics and supply systems to increase the Marine Corps’ lethality. 
Other examples of this cultural undertone exist with the creation of Marine Maker spaces 
and with driving a bottoms-up approach to AM implementation instead of the traditional 
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centralized and downward control. This maker culture in warfare is not the first time in 
history that Soldiers would fabricate and manufacture in austere and remote environments. 
The Roman legionnaires were just as effective warriors as they were manufacturers, which 
allowed them a strategic advantage against the far larger-numbering Gallic foes in the 
conquest of modern-day France (Carlin, 2017). As Marines continue to fight abroad, this 
capability and mindset has again strategic implications for the Marine Corps’ future 
success against foes that outnumber the Marine Corps. This cultural shift is the most 
important aspect of AM integration, which—it appears—the Marine Corps has effectively 
grasped and disseminated to all Marines. 
2. MCO 4700.4: Risk Tolerance Vice Risk Avoidance 
Another cultural shift is placing the responsibility or risk of AM production with 
battalion and regimental-level commanders. Even though the mission statement 
specifically identifies “commanders at all levels” (DC I&L, 2020, p. 1), the fact that it did 
not exclude those battalion and regimental commanders is significant. This significance is 
further evident in allowing those commanders to produce any item, including red bin items 
that have been deemed unfit by the AMOC, if the operational impacts outweigh the risks 
of printing the item. Placing this risk decision on the on-site commander will more likely 
inspire all commanders to implement this new technology as they have more influence on 
the process with this decision-making capability. Having a risk tolerant and risk mitigating 
culture instead of a risk avoidant culture is key to effectively adopting any new technology, 
and AM is no exception. 
3. AM Education and Training 
In conjunction with risk tolerance, the drive for thorough AM educational programs 
shows the dedication the Marine Corps has to adopting AM throughout the entire force. 
MCO 4700.4 presents a detailed and tiered approach to education. Also, with the creation 
of Marine Maker spaces, these spaces will support the cultural change of making every 
Marine a maker and truly try to indoctrinate, instead of just simply using this new 
technology. The Marine Corps also plans to create an additional military occupational 
specialty (AMOS) for AM in FY2022 (Douglas, 2020). This will first incentive Marines to 
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educate themselves, as attaining AMOSs makes Marines more competitive for promotion. 
Second, Marines with AMOSs instead of just training certificates are easier to identify in 
Marine Corps administrative and manning repositories such as Marine Online and 
Command Profile. This identification will allow all leaders, not just the specific Marine’s 
immediate supervisor, access to which Marine Corps units have AM-trained Marines. 
Furthermore, this identification can be paired with a unit’s TO to help determine which 
units require AM-trained Marines and prioritize those units for training. 
4. MCO 4700.4’s CAD File Bin System 
The bin system for AM parts allows for increased operational flexibility. The bin 
system of identifying AM parts for printing by green, yellow, blue, and red allows not only 
the AMOC to broadcast the status of CAD files, but it also helps commanders identify risks 
immediately. For example, if an operation dictates the printing of an item that is not green, 
the commander can easily make a risk-based decision based on the color identification and 
the situation on-site. If the item is blue, the commander might deem it worth printing rather 
than if the item were red. Thus, commanders can make informed risk-based decisions on 
all items—not just decisions based on a red or not red status. 
5. MCO 4700.4’s Equipment Tiers 
In conjunction with the bin system flexibility, the tiered approach to AM equipment 
implementation offers increased flexibility and other advantages to the Marine Corps. It 
captures the advantages of both a centralized and distributed AM implementation as Boer 
(2020) and his team discussed. Centralized AM manufacturing can be seen at the 
intermediate and depot levels by providing a robust AM suite of equipment that focuses on 
the production of items with a below-average demand and long manufacturing lead times 
(Boer et al., 2020). Distributed AM manufacturing can be seen at the organizational and 
intermediate levels by providing forward printing at or close to the point of need for those 
items with an unpredictable demand and short manufacturing lead times (Boer et al., 2020). 
The intermediate level contains both centralized and decentralized aspects with the design 
of the XFAB. Even though the XFAB comes with a suite of printers as well as computers 
and servers for CAD file creation and management, which serve in a more central role, the 
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expandable shelter is still a mobile asset that can more easily maneuver in a operational 
environment than other more permanent structures. The XFAB does not achieve the 
mobility of the TACFAB or the robust capabilities of a depot but seeks to achieve both 
capability and mobility. In conjunction with the organizational and depot level, this 
blending of both a centralized and distributed AM process provides tailored packages for 
the Marine Corps to apply to a wide range of military operations.  
As evident in the tiered approach, the XFAB and TACFAB have effectively 
integrated AM technology into Marine Corps operational needs. The Marine Corps 
operates in diverse environments and operational situations. One system cannot adequately 
fulfill all the requirements for Marine Corps units operating in the multitude of diverse 
situations. Thus, different systems mirrored to the tiered approach seek to offer on-site 
commanders with the flexibility to adopt various AM equipment postures to best manage 
the operational environment. The XFAB system is an expandable shelter with multiple 3D 
printers inside. The TACFAB system is comprised of the LulzBot TAZ 6 3D printer. As a 
system’s concept, the XFAB and TACFAB perform well in both kinetic and nonkinetic 
environments. However, only the XFAB’s expandable shelter performed well in both 
environments. The TACFAB’s LulzBot TAZ 6 3D printer does not possess the same 
capabilities as other similar printers such as the Kijenzi discussed by Savonen and his team 
(2018). Therefore, the LulzBot printer, not the TACFAB concept, is a limiting factor; 
replacing the LulzBot printer could potentially address performance issues in austere 
environments without the need to replace the entirety of the TACFAB concept. 
As depicted in Tables 10 and 11, the printer requirements and design characteristics 
Savonen and his team discussed are used to grade the XFAB expandable shelter, the 
TACFAB’s LulzBot TAZ 6 3D printer, and the Kijenzi 3D printer. This research is not 
grading the TACFAB concept but the LulzBot TAZ 6 3D Printer. 
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Table 10. XFAB, LulzBot, and Kijenzi Grades for Savonen’s Printer 
Requirements. Adapted from Savonen et al. (2018), Slate (2004). 
Requirements XFAB LulzBot Kijenzi 
The 3D printer must be able to make useful parts.    
The 3D printer must be able to function independent of 
infrastructure.  
  
The 3D printer must be able to be easily transported.    
The 3D printer must be safe and easy to use.    
The 3D printer must be able to withstand harsh 
environments.  
  




For printer requirements, the XFAB and Kijenzi printer perform far better than the 
LulzBot. For printing useful parts, the XFAB trailer far exceeds the others, as it can print 
both polymer and metal items with both AM and hybrid manufacturing techniques. For 
infrastructure requirements, all can operate autonomously, but the XFAB and LulzBot will 
require nonsolar energy to operate. This fuel type limitation means the XFAB and LulzBot 
require a fuel source to be transported throughout the host nation. For transportability, the 
Kijenzi far exceeds the others by being transportable in two large duffel bags. Even though 
the XFAB trailer is far larger and heavier than the other two printers; however, when 
accounting for the relative capabilities that the XFAB provides, it still is relatively able to 
be transported. For safety and ease of use, all three printers are safe and easy to use. For 
handling harsh environments, the XFAB is a hardened trailer that can withstand various 
environments, while the Kijenzi is a ruggedized 3D printer. The LulzBot, however, was 
not designed for use in a harsh environment and requires shelter from the elements for 
operation. For cost, the XFAB is the most expensive by far. However, similar to the 
transportability grading, it still receives a marginal grade when accounting for the 
capabilities it offers. According to the LulzBot webpage, that printer costs $2,500 
(LulzBot, 2020), while the Kijenzi only costs $776.28 (Savonen et al., 2018).  
Again, this research does not seek to demonstrate that the TACFAB concept is ill-
suited for Marine Corps operations. Rather, this research seeks to demonstrate that other 
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printers besides the LulzBot TAZ 6 3D printer exist that are potentially better to be fielded 
within the TACFAB system. 
Table 11. XFAB, LulzBot, and Kijenzi Grades for Savonen’s Printer Design 
Characteristics. Adapted from Savonen et al. (2018), Slate (2004). 
Design Characteristics XFAB LulzBot Kijenzi 
Fused Filament Fabrication (FFF)    
Open-Source RepRap Design    
Modular Design    
Separable Frame    
Protected Electronics     
On-Board Computer System    
Flexible Power Supply    
Climate Control Mechanisms    
 
For design characteristics, the XFAB and Kijenzi printer again perform far better 
than the LulzBot. For FFF, all printers are capable of this fabrication, but the XFAB scored 
higher, as it can manufacture a far wider variety of items with various materials and 
techniques. Open-Source RepRap Design was not used as a grading metric, as RepRap is 
a civilian project to increase interoperability of printers with partner nations in the civilian 
RepRap initiative (Savonen et al., 2018). For modular design, the XFAB has the most 
modularity inside the expandable trailer, while the Kijenzi does offer modularity for 
follow-on expansion. However, the LulzBot is a fairly closed system that does not offer 
much in the way of future expansion. For separable frame, the XFAB is not able to be 
broken down into separate parts for transport; however, with it being an expandable shelter, 
the XFAB does offer some of the same benefits of a separable frame when taking its robust 
capabilities into consideration. The Kijenzi offers the most benefit in a separable frame for 
ease of transport. For protected electronics, the XFAB offers the most protection with a 
hardened structure, while the LulzBot offers little to no protection for its electronics and 
requires other structures to protect it during printing. For on-board computer system, all 
three systems have an on-board computer; however, the XFAB allows for storage of CAD 
file servers and CAD file creation to a scale that the other two systems do not provide. For 
flexible power supply, the Kijenzi offers the most flexibility with the ability to use solar 
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power as well as traditional energy sources. Finally, only the XFAB and Kijenzi offer a 
climate control mechanism while the LulzBot does not. This grading demonstrates that the 
XFAB and Kijenzi exceed expectations in several design areas while achieving at least 
minimal scores in all other requirements and design characteristics, while the LulzBot 
printer is either meeting marginal standards or not meeting standards at all. 
MCO 4700.4 provides the programmatic baseline upon which the Marine Corps 
can provide a deliberate and synchronized path forward in further integrating and 
expanding AM capabilities for the entire force. Overall, the document serves the Marine 
Corps well in covering the previously mentioned sections. Furthermore, the document does 
address, at a minimum indirectly, the decreasing of total ownership costs for Marine Corps 
systems, more timely delivery of capabilities to the warfighter, and increased performance 
to the warfighter. Finally, it adequately addresses risk to ensure that leaders can make risk-
tolerant decisions to achieve the greatest benefit while diminish risk to appropriate levels. 
Even though risk decisions are addressed within the document, other areas or a lack of 
other areas does present some overarching programmatic risk to the adoption of AM into 
the Marine Corps. 
B. WHAT UNIQUE RISKS DOES AM PRESENT TO THE MARINE CORPS? 
The most significant risk to AM, which is not adequately captured in MCO 4700.4, 
is the lack of a robust cybersecurity plan. This research does not seek to say that 
cybersecurity is not considered nor that other documents were created that are not available 
to the general public. For the latter point, it makes sense to keep such documents under 
stricter distribution as to not provide adversaries with the plans for how to specifically 
secure the AM cybersecurity posture. However, certain elements of MCO 4700.4 indicate 
either a lack of a cybersecurity plan or provide an inadequate cybersecurity plan at best. 
This subsection initially provides an overview of the risk Risk Management Framework 
(RMF) and, in particular, the three key elements to safeguard, which are confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability (CIA) of data. Then, this research analyzes those elements of 
cybersecurity that present either unnecessary or needlessly high risk. Finally, analysis is 
conducted on how to either remove or mitigate the previously mentioned risk. 
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1. RMF Overview 
The Department of Commerce’s (DOC) Federal Information Processing Standards 
(FIPS) Publication 199 and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special 
Publication 800-60 Volume I describe both the definitions of CIA and the RMF process, 
respectively. Figure 17 depicts the definitions of CIA and their impacts if comprised. 
Figure 18 depicts the six-step RMF process. 
 
Figure 17. Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability Definitions and Impacts. 
Source: Department of Commerce (2004). 
58 
 
Figure 18. Risk Management Framework Overview 
Source: Department of Commerce (2008). 
The key RMF step for this research is Step 1, Categorize. This step is the categorization of 
a system with regard to the three criteria discussed in Figure 17. For example, if a system 
were deemed to have a high confidentiality rating, then the impact to having its 
confidentiality comprised would be a severe or catastrophic impact, while if it only had a 
low confidentiality rating then the impact would be limited. As MCO 4700.4 implies that 
the 3D printers are not yet authorized for access to the MCEN and a new digital repository 
(which replicates with JAMMEX) will be replacing the current digital repository, time is 
available to categorize and correct any cybersecurity deficiencies. This research conducts 
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an abbreviated form of Step 1 to demonstrate the impact that a lack of robust cybersecurity 
can have on AM implementation.  
2. RMF Categorization Example #1 
The first example is the categorization of 3D printers on the MCEN. As the 
Zeltmann article discussed, changing the files to insert weak points as well as changing just 
the direction of the printer can have severe effects on the print and resulting item quality 
(Zeltmann et al., 2016). However, basic knowledge of these printers—such as schematics, 
printer speed, printer quality, and other such technical aspects—is readily available on the 
internet. Thus, adversaries having this basic information of the printers is not a threat. With 
the understanding that this information is readily available to everyone, confidentiality 
would be rated with a low impact. However, integrity would be rated with a high impact 
grading, as affecting print quality and printer direction has a severe impact (Zeltmann et 
al., 2016). 
Furthermore, as having access to these printers is paramount to receiving printed 
items, an attack on a printer’s availability would be severe. However, adversaries need to 
have physical access to these printers as they are not connected to the internet as of MCO 
4700.4’s publication to effectively target their availability. When grading the availability 
of the entire inventory of printers but only removing the availability of a few printers, the 
availability grading of the entire inventory would decrease to a serious or moderate impact. 
This grading changes, though, when considering MCO 4700.4’s objective of connecting 
these printers to the internet. When these printers connect to the internet, adversaries can 
target the entire inventory and from a remote location. As MCO 4700.4 desires to connect 
these printers to the internet, this research will grade availability under that objective. Thus, 
printer availability with a connection to the internet would have a severe or high impact, as 
adversaries can target the entirety of the printer inventory and stop them from being able 
to print items.  
To conclude, these printers have a low impact rating for confidentiality, a high 
impact rating for integrity, and a high impact rating for availability if connected to the 
internet. Therefore, the primary objectives of cybersecurity efforts and controls are 
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twofold. First, safeguards must be implemented to protect the printer’s integrity against 
adversaries’ destructive modification or alteration of the printers. Second, safeguards must 
also protect against the ability to remove the availability of the entire inventory of printers. 
Risk-based decision-making should be conducted to weigh both the benefits and problems 
with connecting these printers to any network. 
3. RMF Categorization Example #2 
The second example is the categorization of any digital repository for the Marine 
Corps CAD files. This research assumes that this digital repository of CAD files will also 
store the location of AM equipment as recommended in the 2019 DODIG report. The 
location of AM equipment is vital information for not only Marine Corps forces but for 
adversaries as well. However, knowing the location of an AM printer would only have 
serious implications if follow-on adversarial actions were to occur to make the situation 
severe or catastrophic. Therefore, confidentiality would be ranked moderate. As previously 
stated, minor alterations to files can have significant impacts to the printed items’ quality. 
Therefore, integrity is again rated high due to the severe impacts a breach of integrity would 
have on CAD files. Finally, availability of the website is critical for Marines to print files. 
This could be mitigated with the creation of local servers that replicate the central database, 
but the removal of the digital repository would still have severe implications. Thus, 
availability would be graded high. To conclude, the digital repository would have a 
moderate impact grading for confidentiality, but a high impact grading for integrity and 
availability. Cybersecurity efforts should prioritize this digital repository first before 
proceeding to put the printers on the network, as more areas of CIA are rated higher for the 
digital repository than for placing the printers on the network. 
4. Future RMF Implementation  
As the digital repository has far larger cybersecurity impacts if compromised, 
actions must be immediately taken to safeguard against adversarial actions. First, the 
current digital repository is open facing to the World Wide Web and only requires 
username and password authentication. Second, MCO 4700.4 contains the URL for this 
website, and MCO 4700.4 can be found relatively quickly with a simple online search. 
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Third, the order places cybersecurity responsibility with MCSC and with DC I as a 
supporting role, but the order does not mandate the usage of the RMF process or discuss 
other specific steps to help safeguard against adversarial cyber threats. However, simple 
and quick actions can be taken to mitigate these three issues.  
First, the next digital repository must require CAC authentication for both account 
creation and ongoing access. Another step to further shield against adversarial attacks 
would be to implement two-factor authentication. This last step might compromise 
availability of the system for those Marines in remote locations and without adequate cell 
phone service. Other two-factor authentication measures are available besides cell phones, 
but again two-factor authentication might not be necessary if CAC authentication is 
deemed sufficient to mitigate against the risk of unauthorized access and manipulation of 
the data. Second, the next digital repository must only be accessible on a government 
machine. This would mitigate against denial of service attacks or easy location of the 
website. Also, printing the location of the digital repository would no longer be as a 
significant of an issue if the site could only be accessed from a U.S. government machine. 
Finally, if DC I is actively engaged and supporting MCSC and the AMOC in the creation 
of a robust cybersecurity plan, then no issue exists in this third category. However, the 
research indicates that this collaboration is not happening when statements are issued such 
as, “3D printers are similar to MFDs thus should already be approved for access on the 
network,” when research suggests that AM printers and other MFDs are in fact quite 
different. With a robust cybersecurity plan, the Marine Corps can shield against adversarial 
actions that would negate the gains already achieved with AM implementation into the 
Marine Corps. 
C. WHAT SPECIFIC OPPORTUNITIES DOES AM PROVIDE THE MARINE 
CORPS THAT THEY ARE NOT PURSUING OR NOT PURSUING TO ITS 
FULLEST EXTENT? 
AM has proven to effectively decrease maintenance time and costs. One such 
example is the 3DP of a helicopter helmet visor clip, which decreased the cost from $300 
to $0.75 and the time from 9 months to 10 days (USD AT&L, 2017). However, AM can 
also provide printable systems to the warfighter where the acquisitions of the CAD file and 
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printers are the cost and not the actual system. One such example of this AM capability is 
the fielding of the 3DP UAS system, which not only decreases the cost of the system from 
the $200,000–$250,000 range to about $3,000 (USD[AT&L], 2017); it also allows for the 
on-site printing of the UAS without any requirement for traditional ordering, 
manufacturing, and shipment. This change in acquisitions will further decrease costs by 
not requiring the transport of the system and will also decrease the time to field these 
systems as the critical path is influenced by the printer speed, not the manufacturing and 
shipment of the system. In addition to increasing warfighter capabilities by fielding printers 
instead of systems, this change to the acquisitions of printers vice systems will shorten the 
acquisitions process to a more agile, responsive, and timely process (Schrand, 2016). 
However, AM offers two other unique opportunities to the Marine Corps. The first 
opportunity is increasing the flexibility for Marine Corps units responding to HADR 
operations. The second opportunity is to mitigate the threat that the Chinese WEZ presents 
to logistics operations inside the South China Sea. 
1. HADR Operations 
HADR operations are a key capability that the Marine Corps provides to the DOD 
and the nation’s allies. All military services have HADR capabilities, but the Marine Corps’ 
expeditionary roots make them ideal candidates to respond to natural disasters. With the 
addition of AM capabilities such as the TACFAB and XFAB, the Marine Corps can be 
even more responsive and impactful in responding to natural disasters. The tiered approach 
of AM capabilities to organizations further tailors capabilities to specific scenarios. The 
two likely tiers to respond to HADR events would be the operational and intermediate 
levels through the use of the TACFAB and XFAB, respectively. Unlike kinetic operations 
where security is paramount and the risk to force from adversarial actors is high, nonkinetic 
operations have decreased security concerns. Thus, with kinetic operations, only the 
TACFAB should be placed close to the forward edge of battle while the XFAB would be 
placed further back to increase security for that critical asset. However, if the Marine Corps 
were responding to a natural disaster today like it did in response to Super Typhoon 
Yolanda, both the organizational and intermediate level of AM could be placed at the point 
of need as the security concerns decreased. The ability to place both the TACFAB and 
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XFAB throughout the supply chain allows for further mobility, diminished supply line 
requirements, and longer operational endurance. For HADR operations, the lack of the 
XFAB’s tactical mobility is not as significant, as it does offer strategic mobility to be 
transported throughout a host nation with the decrease in security risks. Thus, the change 
in security and mobility requirements during HADR operations allows the XFAB to be 
placed at major cities or towns that have been devastated, and the TACFAB and contact 
teams can disburse to outlying smaller towns and villages. 
The current constraint facing the Marine Corps’ HADR capabilities is not the 
TACFAB or XFAB concept, but the LulzBot TAZ 6 3D printer. As evident in the 
previously mentioned grading, the LulzBot scored poorly in withstanding harsh 
environments, having protected electronics, and having climate control mechanisms. It 
scored marginally in cost, modular design, and flexible power supply. All six of these 
categories are required during both kinetic and nonkinetic operations, but a flexible power 
supply is even more advantageous during HADR operations when traditional supply lines 
are destroyed and the transportation of fuel becomes either hindered or unavailable. The 
Kijenzi printer scored acceptable in five of these metrics and only marginal in one 
metric(i.e., the ablity to withstand harsh environments). Thus, the Marine Corps should 
focus efforts not on the concept of the TACFAB and XFAB but on what is the composition 
of the equipment within those systems.  
2. AM Operations Inside the Chinese WEZ 
The other unique opportunity AM provides the Marine Corps is its response to the 
Chinese ballistic missile threat against logistics activities occurring within the WEZ. As 
depicted in Figures 10 and 11, the Chinese possess an extensive and overlapping ballistic 
missile network. This network can threaten supply lines as far as San Diego, with the threat 
only increasing the closer those logistics activities move toward the South China Sea. If 
kinetic operations were to occur between the United States and China, U.S. forces 
operating in nations close to China—such as Vietnam, Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea, 
and Japan—could have their supply lines severely threatened. AM cannot mitigate the 
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threat away completely for all classes of supply; however, it could provide certain classes 
of supply alternative means of obtaining the needed items and mitigate the risk. 
The supply lines for Class I, III, and V cannot effectively be hardened with the use 
of AM. Even though the Marine Corps is making efforts to lighten ammunition with the 
use of AM (Athey, 2020), this ammunition production’s objective is to decrease the weight 
of the ammunition, not provide ammunition production in a combat environment. 
Furthermore, LtGen Michael G. Dana highlighted in the Marine Corps Installations & 
Logistics Roadmap, 2017 that Class I, III, and V are the primary classes of supply that need 
to be transported (DC I&L, 2017). Other avenues besides AM need to be pursued to harden 
those logistics activities while Marines operate in the South China Sea. 
However, AM can provide logistics support to Marines operating within the WEZ 
for Classes VIII and IX. First, Class VIII and IX are generally more expensive than Class 
I, III, and V. Thus, ships transporting these high value items would be more appealing for 
the Chinese to strike with their own expensive ballistic missiles. However, if the item is 
printed on site, the Chinese do not have the ability to destroy the item in transit as the 
transportation requirement has been nearly removed. Second, the costs of transporting the 
items would be greatly reduced as the actual items being transported are raw materials and 
not the end-item. The threat to transportation is strikes against the raw materials, not the 
end-items. However, raw materials are less expensive and, therefore, less appealing as a 
target. Also, the raw materials can be shipped from various locations and countries and not 
the OEM, which is likely located within the continental United States. Therefore, 
transporting raw materials allows for greater concealment, as the raw materials are coming 
from multiple countries and locations instead of just a U.S. ship sailing from the continental 
United States.  
D. DATA ANALYSIS CONCLUSION 
The Marine Corps has taken great initial strides in implementing AM into the 
Marine Corps. The publication of MCO 4700.4 is a highly detailed document that provides 
initial guidance to all commanders and their Marines. The cultural shift has begun, and 
now is the time to harden the initial gains that AM has provided. One such activity will be 
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to harden AM’s cybersecurity posture. However, AM also can provide unique 
opportunities to handle both nonkinetic operations, such as HADR operations, as well as 
kinetic operations of operating within the Chinese WEZ. Ultimately, the Marine Corps has 
achieved a programmatic approach to AM integration by decreasing cost and time while 
also increasing performance of warfighters capabilities. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The primary objective of this research was to analyze the Marine Corps’ current 
AM integration efforts. The research determined that, overall, the Marine Corps has 
effectively integrated AM technology within the force and predominantly through the 
publication of MCO 4700.4. This integration occurred in spite of the bureaucratic nature 
of the DOD (Schrand, 2016) and AM being a relatively new technology that is rapidly 
evolving. A secondary objective of this research was to determine unique risks to AM and 
whether the Marine Corps is adequately mitigating those risks. Furthermore, another 
objective was to determine unique opportunities that AM provides beyond the traditional 
maintenance and cost saving benefits. Even though new risks are presented with AM 
technology, and opportunities abound with such a versatile technology, the Marine Corps’ 
cultural change regarding AM integration will help mitigate those risks and capture the 
benefits of various AM opportunities. This research provides these recommendations in 
the hopes of further revisions of MCO 4700.4. Finally, recommendations for further study 
are provided at the end of this chapter. 
A. CYBERSECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Even though the Marine Corps has undergone a cultural change in AM adoption 
with the focus of a bottoms-up approach that focuses on training, risk tolerance instead of 
risk avoidance, and tiered application of AM equipment, the Marine Corps’ primary AM 
risk remains cybersecurity. This research does not conclude that cybersecurity is not being 
considered; however, certain decisions suggest that cybersecurity risks are not being 
mitigated properly. The Marine Corps needs to engage DC I, Cyber Command, and other 
highly technical organizations to assist with cybersecurity efforts to help safeguard against 
adversarial action toward the benefits already achieved through AM integration. Two focus 
areas should be the connectivity of AM printers to the network and the security of the 
upcoming CAD file repository. If cybersecurity efforts are not taken, the Marine Corps 
assumes unnecessary risk toward a potential cybersecurity attack that can target the entire 
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inventory of AM printers, the destruction and manipulation of CAD files, and other 
cybersecurity attacks. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AM OPPORTUNITIES  
Beyond the cybersecurity risks, AM offers various opportunities to Marine Corps 
operational units. First, HADR operations can be more tailored and impactful to host 
nations while removing traditional burdens placed by the Marine Corps on the host nation, 
such as shipment of parts. Second, the Chinese WEZ presents a significant risk to logistics 
and resupply efforts in the South China Sea. AM cannot mitigate the entire risk but does 
offer certain classes of supply alternative means to acquire the necessary items, such as 
repair parts or consumable medical equipment. The Marine Corps must continue the risk-
tolerant and bottoms-up approach to allow the junior Marines and junior officers to 
experiment and grow the AM integration. If this cultural tone is changed to be more top-
down, the Marine Corps risks hindering or impeding further development from the junior 
ranks. 
C. FURTHER STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS  
As this research was limited to open-source information and by the inability to 
purchase printers, one area for further study presents itself regarding the Kijenzi and 
LulzBot printers. The discussion of these printers concludes that the Kijenzi printer is far 
superior to the LulzBot in both performance and cost parameters. However, the Kijenzi 
printer should not be blindly adopted to replace the LulzBot. Instead, a Kijenzi printer—
along with other similar printers—should be purchased to thoroughly test the performance 
capabilities of all the printers before a cost, schedule, and performance decision is made. 
The LulzBot could still be the superior printer; however, it appears other printers exist that 
can perform beyond the LulzBot’s capabilities at a significantly reduced price.  
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